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LEGAL CONCEPTS IN CASES OF El\IINENT 
DOl\IAIN" 
JOSEPH l\f. CORMACK 0 
THERE is nothing original in a suggestion that in legal thinking 
mental concepts should be used instead of physical. Possibly 
the best-known e},.l>Osition of the thought is that of the late 
Wesley N. Hohfeld.1 He e},.1>resses it as a matter of "differentiat-
ing purely legal relations from the physical and mental facts that 
call such relations into being." He gives as 1·easons for the tend-
ency to confuse and blend the two types of concepts, association 
of ideas and defective terminology. Professor Hohfeld's sug-
. gested system of terminology 2 is designed to differentiate legal 
relations from all others. 
Possibly there is something 01iginal in a laboratory study of 
certain of the materials of legal science in order to observe the 
workings of the two types Qf concepts in the actual solution of 
problems. It is with this thought in mind that the field of emi-
nent domain is selected for investigation. 
The principle underlying the law of eminent domain has be-
come crystallized in the form of expression set forth in the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution: " •.• nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." The words "property'' and "take", to which detailed con-
sideration will be given, have thus been encysted in the heart 
of this branch of the law. 
The principle of the juristic necessity of compensation to an 
individual whose property is taken for public use, has been one. 
of the most universally recognized principles of justice.3 It is 
*Professor of Law, University of Southern California; nuthor of The 
Lega~ Tender Cases-A Drama of American Legal and F-inancial Hi<:tONJ 
(1929) 16 VA:. L. REV. 132; The Universal Draft and Constitutional Limita-
tions (1930) 3 So. CALIF. L. REV. 361. 
1 HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICL\L 
REAsONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1923) 27; reprinted from (1913) 
23 YALE L. J. 16, at 20. Cf. Bingham, The Nature and Importance of 
Lega~ Possession (1915) 13 IIIICH. L. REV. 535. 
2 HOHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 65; reprinted from (1917) 26 YALE 
L. J. 710. His suggestions as to terminology are not followed nt nil points 
in this article. 
3 Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain 
(1931) 6 WIS. L. REV. 67. 
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found in the Roman law/ the Code Napoleon,0 and in the legal 
systems of the American colonies.6 The expression eminens do-
minium, with which the principle is now associated, seems first 
to have been used by Grotius, in 1625.7 Provisions such as the 
quoted portion of the Fifth Amendment have now been adopted 
in the constitutions of all the states, save one.8 In that state, 
North Carolina, the principle of Magna Charta that no person 
ought to be deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the 
law of the land,9 has been included in the constitution,t0 and the 
same result has been reached through judicial interpretation of 
that provision.U In instances where, in the past, applicable con-
stitutional provisions have been lacking, courts have nevertheless 
held invalid legislative acts not recognizing the principle.1D In 
addition, the requirement has been imposed upon the states by 
the "due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 
The word "property" is used by Hohfeld as an example of de-
fective terminology. He says: 
"Both with lawyers and with laymen this term has no definite 
or stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to indicate the 
physical object to which various legal rights, privileges, etc., re-
late; then again-with far greater discrimination and accurncy 
4 Matthews, The Valuation of P1·ope1·ty in The Roman Law (1{121), 34 
HARV. L. R. 227, 252. 
5 Bk. II, tit. 2, art. 545. 
61 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2nd ed. 1917) 13, 22. As to the de-
velopment of the principle in England, consult ibid. 6. 
7 DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, lib. iii, c. 20. 
s The history of the adoption of the constitutional provisions is outlined 
in 1 LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) 20. 
9 MAGNA CHARTA, cap. 39, is rendered in STUBBS, SELECl' CHARTERS (Oth 
ed. 1921) 297, following one of the Cottonian manuscripts (Cotton 1\IS,, 
Aug. ii 36): "Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonotur, aut dissniaia• 
tur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut nliquo modo destruatur, nee super cum 
ibimus, nee super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum 
vel per legem terrae." The passage is translated in POUND, READINGS ON 
·THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW (2nd ed. 1913) 147: 11No 
freeman shall be taken, or impriso:ped, or be disseised of his froohold, or 
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise do· 
strayed, nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judg· 
ment of his peers, or by the law of the land.'' 
10 N. C. CoNST., art. 1, § 17: "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned, 
or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, 
or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by tho lnw 
of the land." 
11 Staton v. Norfolk & Carolina R.R., 111 N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181, (1802); 
cj. Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550 (1874); Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cablo 
Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 S. E. 1022 (1902). 
12 Grant, op. cit. supra note 3, at 71. 
13 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 22G, 17 Sup. 
Ct. 581 (1897). See Grant, The Natw·al Law Bacl~ground of Duo P')'OCC!Illl 
(1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 56, 71, 79. 
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-the word is used to denote the legal interest (or aggregate of 
legal relations) appertaining to such physical object. Frequently 
there is a rapid and fallacious shift from the one meaning to the 
other. At times, also, the term is used in such a 'blended' sense 
as to convey no definite meaning whatever." 14 
The usage first referred to may be desclibed as the use of a 
physical concept, the latter of a mental. The one may be de-
scribed as a concept of property as consisting of tangible phy-
sical objects, with which certain human beings are more or less 
intimately connected; the other as a concept of property as con-
sisting of legal relations between human beings, some of which 
relations to a greater or less degree involve conh·ol over certain 
physical objects. In the use of the former concept the lawyer's 
mind is directed primarily toward things, in the latter to\":ard 
human beings. The one deals with material substances, the 
other with abstract conceptions. The one is objective, the other 
subjective. 
A difficulty in connection with the use of the physical concept 
has been thus expressed by 1\Ir. Justice Holmes: "The fact 
that tangible property is also visible tends to give a rigidity to 
our conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to others 
less concretely clothed." 1~ It is worthy of note that the viewpoint 
of the Roman (and, therefore, of the civil) law seems to favor 
the use of the mental concept of property. Thus in the Digest 
we find the title De Adquirendo Renan Dominio.16 The refer-
ence is to the acquiring of ownei'ship of things, and not to the 
acquiring of things as sucbP The word propl'ietQ..s in Roman • 
law never means a material thing, but a legal position in regard 
to it; the thing itself is '1mlteria.18 
"Take" is a term much like "transfer," which is used by 
Hohfeld as an illustration of the difficulty, as regards legal ter-
14 HOHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 28. Compare Bowen, The Ccmccpt 
of P1'ivate Proprrl"ty (1925) 11 CORN. L. Q. 41. But see Costigan, A Plnt 
for a Modern Definition and Cla.Ssijicatimz of Real P1·opcrty (190!J) 12 
YALE L. J. 425. 
15 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155, 41 Sup. Ct. ·158, 459 (1921). He 
has beautifully described the variable quality of a v:ord, as follows: "A 
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of n living 
thought, and may vary greatly in color and content according to the cir-
cumstances and the time in which it is used.11 Tovme v. Eisner, 2·15 U. S. 
418, 425, 38 Sup. Ct. 158, 159 (1918). 
1s DIG. 41.1.9.6. 
17 While Buckland provisionally calls dominium ovmership, he feels that 
this is a little misleading, and prefers to consider dominima "the ultimate 
right to the thing.'' BUCKLAND, A l\IANUAL OF Ro!IIAN PRIVATE LAW (19!!5) 
110, 112. Res, like our "property", is sometimes used in a physical, and 
sometimes in a mental, sense. Ibid. 107. 
18 :MACLEOD, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS (1881) 143. 
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minology, that many of the words used were originally applicable 
only to physical things.19 He points out that the use of such 
terms in connection with legal relations is, strictly speaking, 
figurative or fictional, and essentially metaphorical. Confusion 
and blurring of ideas are easy results of such a condition. 
To take, from the standpoint of the physical meaning of the 
word, means to acquire custody. The gist of the other, or mental, 
usage possible in regard to the meaning of taking is placed by 
Shakespeare in the mouth of Shylock. After the judgment of 
the court the merchant of Venice says : 
"You take my house when you do take the prop 
"That doth sustain my house; you take my life 
"When you do take the means whereby I live." 20 
The prominent position of the work "take" in the American 
law of eminent domain is fortuitous, but its influence has not 
been thereby lessened. While the words "take" and "property'' 
cannot be dissociated in the present connection, the problem in 
regard to choice of concepts is the same in regard to both. 
A choice, in eminent domain cases, between the concepts which 
have been discussed involves important consequences. Under 
the physical concept it is necessary, in order that compensation 
to the condemnee be required, that he be deprived of the posses~ 
sion of land or some other tangible physical object. Under the-
mental concept, it is only necessary that there be interference 
with some of the legal relations which, from the standpoint of 
this concept, constitute his property.21 
The two leading writers in the field of eminent domain dis· 
agree as to which of the concepts should be used. Nichols ll2 
approves the former, and Lewis 23 the latter. Nichols supports 
the physical concept largely upon the ground of adht'lrence to 
precedent, and the use of the word "taken" in constitutional 
provisions. Lewis supports the legal relations concept by quot· 
ing the language of decisions which will be discussed in this 
article. 
It is the purpose of eminent domain proceedings to distribute 
throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual 
by the making of public improvements. In the light of this 
public policy, the ideal to be aimed at is that the compensation 
awarded shall put the injured party in as good condition as he 
would have been in if the condemnation proceedings had not 
19 HOHFELD, op. cit. Sttpl'a note 1, at 30. 
20 THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act. 4, sc. 1, 1. 375. 
21 Notice will be taken later of the practical difficulties which render 
impossible compensation because of every such interference. 
22 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 299. 
2a 1 LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 62. 
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occuned.24 Nothing short of this is adequate compensation.::~> 
The law of eminent domain is merely one method of approach 
to the problems of the law of damages. As 1\Ir. Justice Holmes 
has well expressed it, a constitution deals "with persons, not with 
tracts of land."-26 Either a physical or a legal relations concep-
tion of the process is simply a tool for the use of the legal 
profession in adjusting the relations of human beings. A choice 
between the conceptions must be made upon considerations of 
comparative usefulness for purposes of legal thinking in malt-
ing such adjustments. 
Any concept is adequate if it produces proper results for the 
.purpose at hand, 27 and during the early development of the law 
of this country a purely physical conception of the process of 
condemnation was amply sufficient. In Colonial times there 
was little necessity for the use of eminent domain procedure. 
There were no roads, nearly all land was unsettled and unim-
proved, and much had not been even allotted to private owner-
ship. While the "marginal" land ~f the economists surrounded 
all land which was used, land in small sh·ips had no appreciable 
value. "'\Vhen a road was constructed, it simply traversed the 
surface of the land, without cuts or fills, and there '":ere no 
locomotives to belch forth sparks and fumes, or pipes to be laid 
for public utilities.28 "Whenever there was any occasion for the 
institution of eminent domain proceedings, the land was "t-aken" 
in every sense of the word.:w Under these conditions, the physi-
cal concept of the taking of property for public use developed. 
Its use was later encouraged by the adoption of constitutional · 
provisions containing the words "take" and "property," with 
their physical connotations. The concept thus obtained a strong 
hold upon the courts, so that Sedgwick, writing in 1857, stated 
the law as follows: 
"It seems to be settled that, to entitle the owner to protection 
. . . the property must be actually taken in the physic.:'ll sense 
24 See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 29!J, 304, 43 
Sup. Ct. 354, 356 (1923). 
21> This method of e.'\.1Jression is borrowed from )lr. Justice Campbell, in -
Grand Rapids & Ind. R.R. v. Heisel, 47 Mich. 393, 398, 11 N. W. 212, 215 
(1882). It is obvious that practical difficulties of administration make 
impossible anything more than approach to attainment of the ideal sug-
gested. 
26 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195, 
30 Sup. Ct. 459, 460 (1910). 
21 The writer is indebted to oral statements of Professor Walter Wheeler 
Cook for this thought. 
28 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supi"CL note 6, at 14. 
2n Statutes providing for the necessities of mills "were treated merely 
as a regulation of the conflicting rights of the different riparian owners 
in the stream." Ibid. 20. 
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of the word, and that the proprietor is not entitled to claim 
remuneratio!l for indirect or consequential damage, no matter 
how serious or how clearly and unquestionably resulting from 
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. This rule has been 
repeatedly declared in many of the States of the Union." 00 
After discussing the decisions, Sedgwick criticized this atti-
tude on the part of the courts: 
"To differ from the voice of so many learned and sagacious 
magistrates, may almost wear the aspect of presumption; but 
I cannot refrain from the expression of the opinion, that this 
limitation of the term taking to the actual physical appropria-
tion of property or a divesting of the title is, it seems to me, far 
too narrow a construction to answer the purposes of justice, 
or to meet the demands of an equal administration of the great 
powers of government/' 31 
In 1823 it was said, in the.Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, in discussing the applicable provision of the constitu-
tion of that state, that it had "ever been confined, in judicial 
application, to the case of property actually taken and appro· 
priated by the government." 32 
Mr. Chief Justice John B. Gibson, the great builder of the 
law of Pennsylvania,33 advanced the novel contention that it was 
necessary to leave some elements of compensation outside the 
protection of the Constitution, in order to prevent excessive 
awards.34 In connection with early eminent domain proceedings, 
the courts were so impressed with the drastic nature of the 
expedient, in its effect upon the individual, that they were in .. 
clined to favor him in the matter of compensation. As the im-
portance of public improvements in the development of the 
country became more manifest, this feeling disappeared. The 
sympathies of the courts then tended to be with those initiating 
such enterprises. 
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the use of a phy-
sical conception in this connection was made by Mr. Chief Justice 
. Gibson in 1843, in Monongahela Naviga.tion Company v. Coons.an 
It was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation 
because of the flooding of his mill as a result of obstruction of 
the stream. The learned justice said: 
3 0 SEDGWICK, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1857) 519. 
a1 Ibid. 524. 
32 1\Ir. Chief Justice Parker, in Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. (18 Muss.) 
418, 430 (1823). 
33 See excellent biographical sketch in MATLACK, 3 GnEAT Al\lEitiOAN 
LAWYERS (1908) 353. 
34 Philadelphia and Trenton R.R., 6 Whart. 25, 46 (Pa. 1840). 
35 6 Watts & S. 101 (Pa. 1843). 
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"Now, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's mill vms taken or 
applied, in any legitimate sense, by the State, or by the company 
invested with its power; nor can it be said he was deprived of 
it. . . . It is true, that a nuisance by flooding a man's land was 
originally considered so far a species of ouster, that l1e might 
have had remedy for it by assize of novel disseisin, or assize 
of nuisance, at his election; but we are not to suppose that the 
framers of the Constitution meant to entangle their meaning in 
the mazes of the jus mztiqztwn. It was aptly said by Chief Jus-
tice Tilghman, in The Farmers' and 1\fechanics' Bank v. Smith, 
(3 Serg. & Rawle 69), that conventions to regulate the conduct 
of nations are not to be interpreted lilre articles of agreement 
at the common law; and that where multitudes are to be affected 
by the construction of an instrument, great regard should be paid 
to the spirit and intention. And the reason for it is an obvious 
one. A constitution is made, not particularly for the inspection 
of lawyers, but for the inspection of the million, that they may 
read and discern in it their rights and their duties; and it is 
consequently expressed in the terms that are most familiar to 
them. Words, therefore, which do not of themselves denote that 
they are used in a technical sense, are to have their plain, popu-
lar, obvious, and natural meaning; and, applying this rule to 
the conte:A-t of the Constitution, we have no difficulty in saying 
that the State is not bound beyond her will to pay for property 
which she has not taken to herself for the public use." :JG 
The learned justice's assumption as to the understanding of 
laymen seems correct, as applied to the word "take", which the 
layman has occasion to use only in a physical sense. As to the 
word "property'', however, it seems proper to ask whether lay-
men, as well as lawyers, do not use it when they desire to have 
a general term covering every element of an individual's finan-
cial well-being. Is not the layman's thought represented by 
the following statement: "These terms, 'life,' 'liberty,' and 
'property,' are representative terms and cover every right to 
which a member of the body politic is entitled under the law." 37 
It is a remarkable coincidence that in the same op!nion, in 
the Monongahela. case, Mr. Chief Justice Gibson should give 
what is probably the most vivid judicial recognition of the 
practical injustice resulting from the use of a physical concept 
in eminent domain cases: 
"It is not, therefore, enough to set before us a case of moral 
wxong, ·without showing us that we have legal power to redress 
it. Beyond constitutional restraint or legislative power, there 
is none but the legislative will, tempered by its sense of justice, 
3G Ibid. 113. 
3 7 Sherwood, J., in State v. Julow, 129 1\lo. 163, 172, 31 S. W. 781, 782 
(1895). Identical language, except as to the first word, is to be found in 
another criminal case, Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 182, 58 N. E. 1007, 
1009 (1900). 
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which has happily been sufficient, in most cases, to protect the 
citizen. Compensation has been provided for every injury which 
could be foreseen, whether within the constitutional injunction 
or not, in all laws for public works by the State or a corpora-
tion; though cases of damage have occurred which could neither 
be anticipated or brought within the benefit of the provision 
by the most strained construction. In one instance, a profitable 
ferry on the Susquehanna, at its confluence with the Juniata, 
was destroyed by the Pennsylvania Canal; and, in another, an 
invaluable spring of water, at the margin of the river, near 
Selinsgrove, was drowned. These losses, like casualties in the 
prosecution of every public work, are accidental, but unavoid-
able; and they are but samples of a multitude of others; so 
that the plaintiffs have at least the miserable good luck to know 
that they have companions in misfortune: would that it were 
in our power to afford them more solid consolation!" 38 
He also wrote the opinion denying compensation in a situation 
where, as he stated the facts, lowering the grade of a street 
had left the plainti:(f's church building worthless, and had left the 
ground on which it stood worth no more than the expense of 
sinking the surface to the common level.39 He said that the 
legislature had "never dreamt that it was laying the foundation 
of such injustice," but held that it was unavoidable.40 
In an early decision denying compensation in a situation where 
the plaintiff had sustained loss through the erection of a rail~ 
road in the street by his land, it was said: 
"The prohibition of the constitution is against taldng private 
property without compensation, and not against injuries to such 
property, where it is not taken. In this case, the private property 
of the plaintiffs is not taken by the defendants; but the whole 
allegation is, that it is injured by erections in its vicinity; and 
the plaintiffs have not, therefore, any claim to have their dam-
ages ascertained and paid for before such erections shall be 
constructed or used." 41 
It was stated, in an early Maine decision,42 that the records of 
judicial proceedings showed that private property in railroads, 
turnpike roads, toll bridges, and ferry ways had been often 
greatly injured, and sometimes quite destroyed, by acts author-
ized by legislation, which, according to judicial decisions, did 
as Supra note 35, at 115. 
ao O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 6 Harris (18 Pa. St.) 187 (1851), 
4° Ibid. 190. See also Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 9 Harris (21 Pn. St.) 
147, 166 (1853). 
41 1\fr. Justice Edmonds, in Drake v. Hudson River R. Co., 7 Bnrb. 0081 
559 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849). 
42 Cushman v. Smith, 34 l\Ie. 247, 257 (1852). 
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not violate any constitutional provision.43 To take a man's land 
for public use was defined as "to deprive him of his title to it, 
or- of some part of his title, so that the entire. dominion over 
it no longer remains with him." 44 
The fact that the public only acquires a revertible easement 
in a highway was used, in an early case,"'~ to justify a refusal 
of compensation46 when land was condemned for such a purpose. 
It was said that in order to come "ithin the constitution there 
"should be such a taking as divests the owner of all title to or 
control over the property taken, and is an unqualified appropria-
tion of it to the public." 47 
The physical conception of the eminent domain process made 
use of the word "property", as well as "take". Thus, in denying 
compensation when a riparian owner complained of loss of the 
benefits of navigation, it was said: 
"What must be understood by the term private property in 
the contemplation of the constitution? 
"It appears to us that it applies to such property as belongs 
absolutely to an individual, and of which he has the exclusive 
right of disposition; property of a specific, fixed, and tangible 
nature, capable of being had in possession and transmitted to 
another, as houses, lands, and chattels." 48 
43 Ibid. 257. 
44Jbid. 260. Mr. Chief Justice Shepley also said, as dicta: "The (consti-
tutional) provision was not designed, and it cannot operate to prevent 
legislation, which should authorize acts, operating directly and injuriously, 
_ as well as indirectly upon private property, when no attempt is made to 
appropriate it to public use. • . . 
"The design appears to have been simply to declare, that private prop-
erty shall not be changed to public property, or transferred from the 
owner to others, for public use, without compensation; to prevent the per-
sonal property of individuals from being consumed or destroyed for public 
use without compensation, not to protect such property from all injury by 
the construction of public improvements; not to prevent its temporary 
possession or use, without a destruction of it, or a change of its character." 
Ibid. 258. 
The following year the same court denied compensation in a case where 
the plaintiff's mill had been damaged through diminution of the flow of 
water because of the erection of a railroad embankment higher up the 
stream. Mr. Chief Justice Shepley said: "No land, estate, or materials 
owned by the plaintiff was taken; and he cannot be entitled to the remedy 
provided by the statute in such cases." Rogers v. Kennebec & P. R.R., 35 
1\Ie. 319, 323 (1853). 
~Livermore v. Town of Jamaica, 23 Vt. 361 (1851). 
46 This is contrary to the settled position developed by the courts in 
regard to easements. See note 110, infra. 
47 Mr. Justice Kellogg, in Livermore v. Town of Jamaica, supra note 45, 
at 365. 
4 8 Mr. Justice Handy, in Commissioners of Hornochitto River v. Withers, 
29 Miss. 21, 32 (1855). In this case the complainant owned a plantation 
bordering upon a former bed of the Mississippi River, through which 
230 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41'' 
In another case it was held that it was not a taking of the 
plaintiff's dwelling house for a railroad company to render it ttn· 
fit for habitation by permitting cars loaded with offensive freight 
to stand upon the tracks within ten feet of the house.40 
In an interesting Wisconsin case, 50 later criticized in the same 
court/1 it was held that the city of Milwaukee was not required 
to make compensation, although it had caused a considernble 
portion of the plaintiff's land to be washed away, with every 
indication that the remainder would be destroyed. This result had 
come about through the excavation by the city of a canal through 
a strip of land which acted as a barrier between the plaintiff's 
land and Lake Michigan, permitting the waves to rush through 
with disastrous effect. It was reasoned that the case was not 
within the constitutional provision, as the city "did not take the 
property," but only "made a great public improvement in the 
vicinity, which incidentally produced the injury complained 
of." u2 
enough water still flowed to keep it navigable. He alleged that a cnnnl 
was being dug which would prevent the water from flowing tht•ough tho 
<>ld bed of the river, thus depriving him of the use of it as a nnvignblo 
body of water. A general demurrer was sustained, upon tho ground of 
freedom of the government from responsibility for tho conscquoncN.I of 
acts done to improve navigation. Following the quotation in tho toxt1 it 
was reasoned that the complainant's property in the water which flowed 
through the old bed -of the river was subject to this limitation. Sec nlso 
In the Matter of Dorrance-Street, 4 R. I. 230, 245 (1856). 
4o Beseman v. Pennsylva:Qia R.R., 50 N. J. L. 235, 13 Atl. 164 (1888). 
~o Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247 (1862). 
~1 In Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223, 227 (1870), it was hold thnt 
the defendant village could not, without paying compensation, drain tho 
waters of a natural reservoir so as to cause them to go upon tho plaintiff's 
land. The Alexander case was distinguished upon tho ground thnt thoro 
the injury to the property of the plaintiff was remote and conscquontinl1 
as it came about only through the blowing of the wind in a particulnr di· 
rection. The distinction is so weak as to imply a criticism. 
In Arimond v. Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co., 31 Wis. 3161 335 
(1872), it was held that compensation must be made whore a lake \VIIS 
2·aised by a dam so as to submerge the plaintiff's lnnd. Mr. Chiof Justice 
Dixon admitted doubt as to the correctness of the decision in tho Ale}:• 
ander case. He stated that "it was an extreme application of tho doctrine 
of damnum absque injuria, and that the principle of it is not to bo OX• 
tended to other and dissimilar cases, or to a case like tho present.'' The 
Arimond case involved the same dam as the leading case of Pumpolly v. 
Green Bay Company, infra note 62. 
s2 Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 50, at 253. It wna lilac 
reasoned that even though the injuries could not be classed as remote and 
speculative, nevertheless the city was not liable, upon tho ground of gov• 
ernmental freedom from responsibility in doing work for the public boncflt, 
Mr. Justice Paine concurred, at 257, upon the ground of adht'ronce to 
precedent. He point!;!d out, however, that even though tho case \VIIS not 
within the letter of the constitutional provision, with which he 11grocd1 in 
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It was held that there was no taking of land for any purpose 
under an ordinance which permitted an adjoining proprietor to 
erect a party wall across the line of his neighbor's land without 
consent, and which compelled the latter to pay half the cost 
of any portion of the wall which he later used. It was reasoned 
that the land was not taken from the owner in any sense, as 
it remained his, together with the wall constructed upon it. He 
was simply required to pay part of the cost of the wall in case 
he used it.:;s 
The obvious failure of such cases to award compensation for 
serious losses, and the consequent failure to accomplish the social 
purpose of eminent domain proceedings, were bound to produce 
a revolt against the use of a physical conception of the process. 
A change in methods of thought was first evidenced by judicial 
recognition that, in cases of so-called destruction, i.e., c..1.ses 
where continued use of land had been made impossible, there 
had been, for legal purposes, a taking of property. The practical 
futility of the distinction behveen taking and damaging was 
there most apparent. Any holding that a destruction of property 
constitutes a taking of it is a departure from a strictly physical 
conception of taking. In the physical acceptation of the term, 
there must be an appropriation by the taker from another. 1\:Ir. 
Justice Brewer thus distinguished an earlier case, upon the 
ground that it "was a case not of the taking, but of the destruc-
tion, of property." 54 
his opinion it was entirely out of harmony with the spirit of the consti-
tutional provision to deny compensation. 
:;sHunt v. Armbruster, 17 N. J. Eq. 208, 214 (1865). It was correctly 
held that there was no public purpose involved. 
G41\1onongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 338, 13 
Sup. Ct. 622, 631 (1893). He was discussing, in the lat~r case, the taJ..:ing 
of a franchise, for which it was held compensation must be made. In the 
earlier case which was distinguished, Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 
U. S. 470 (1881), Congress had e..">:ercised a reserved power to withdraw 
its consent to the construction of a bridge across a navigable river, after 
construction had partially progressed. This was held to be a risk which 
the company had voluntarily assumed when it chose to proceed under the 
limited license which Congress had given, so that no compensation wns 
required. The results in both cases were correct, but the distinction 
should have been put upon the different character of the legal relations 
involved. 
In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 510, 43 Sup. 
Ct. 437, 438 (1923), Il!r. Justice Sutherland said: "1£, under any power, 
a contract or other property is taken for public use, the Government is 
liable; but if injured or destroyed by lawful action, without a taking, the 
Government is not liable." The refusal of compensation in this case was 
proper, as the damage complained of was a legally remote consequence of 
exercise of the war powers. The government had requisitioned the entire 
production of steel plate of a certain plant for a year. This had made 
impossible performance of a contract to deliver plate to the claimant. It 
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The earliest cases treating a destruction as a taking were de-
cided prior to a number of the cases already discussed, and before 
Sedgwick wrote. Perhaps the first case of the kind was Cren-
shaw v. Sktte River Company,55 decided in Virginia in 1828. A 
law had been passed compelling a mill owner to erect loclcs, 
under the penalty of having his mill abated as a nuisance. With-
out citing any cases, and without referring to nny authorities 
other than Blackstone, it was held that eminent domain pro-
ceedings were necessary, Mr. Judge Carr saying: 
"Here then, is a Law imposing upon the citizen a burthen, 
which would render his property worthless, or destroying the 
property in case he refuses to comply. The question forces 
itself upon tts: Can such a Law bind? That the eminent do-
main of the Sovereign Power, extends to the taking private 
property for public purposes, I am free to admit. But then, to 
render the exercise of this power lawful, a fair co,mpensation 
must always be made to the individual, under some equitable 
assessment established by Law. This is laid down by the writers 
on Natural Law, Civil, Common Law, and the Law of every 
civilized country .... I must declare it as my solemn conviction, 
that whether we judge this Law by the principles of all Civilized 
Governments, by the Federal Constitution, or that of our own 
State, it is unconstitutional and void." 50 
In a Massachusetts case 51 decided four years later, tide water 
had been permanently excluded from the plaintiff's land. It was 
held that by this deprivation of the beneficial use of the land, 
there had been, in a legal sense, a taking of it. In another case 
the removal of the owner's dam which had protected a meadow 
by keeping out salt water was held to constitute a taking of the 
meadow.58 
In a Massachusetts case 59 of the period of Rufus Choate, n 
statute was involved which chartered a railroad and provided 
that no other railroad should be authorized over its route within 
a certain period. This was held to constitute a grant of an ex-
was also said, in regard to contracts: "Frustration and appropriation nrc 
essentially different things." Ibid. 513, 43 Sup. Ct. at 439. Componsution 
was awarded where the government through war-time requisition pro-
vented the petitioner from using water which it was entitled by convoy• 
ance and lease to divert from a canal owned by another. Intornntionnl 
Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 399, 51 Sup. Ct. 176 (1931); sco 
(1931) 4 So. CALIF. REV. 320. 
55 6 Rand. 245 (Va. 1828). 
ss Ibid. 264. The other judges concurred in sep'arute opinions. 
51 Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. (29 Mass.) 
467 (1832). 
5s Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. (10 N.J. Eq.) 211 (1854). 
59 Boston and Lowell R.R. v. Salem and Lowell R.R., 2 Gray (68 Muss.) 
1 (1854)·. 
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elusive franchise which could not be violated without compensa-
tion. During the argument Choate and other counsel endeavored 
to induce the court to think of all forms of property in strictly 
physical term.s.co In the opinion l\Ir. Chief Justice Shaw re-
fused to do this, attaching significance to the use in the :i\1assa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights of the term "appropriate", which, 
he said, "is of the largest import and embraces every mode by 
which property may be applied to the public use." ct 
One of the leading cases in the field of eminent domain is 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Compa:ny,02 decided by the United States 
Supreme Court in 1871. In this case compensation was awarded 
because of the overflowing of land through the erection of a 
dam for hydraulic purposes which raised the level of a lake. 
In the opinion l\Ir. Justice l\Iiller said, in a passage which has 
been widely quoted in later cases: 
"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in con-
struing a provision of constitutional law, always understood to 
have been adopted for protection and security to the rights of 
the individual as against-the government, and which has received 
the commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators as 
placing the just principles of the common law on that subject 
beyond the power of ordinary legislation to change or control 
them, it shall be held that if the government refrains from the 
absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public 
it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and per-
manent injury to any e:hi:ent, can, in effect, subject it to total de-
struction without making any compensation, because, in the 
narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken, for the public use. 
Such a consh·uction would pervert the constitutional provision 
into a restriction upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights 
stood at the common law, instead of the government, and make 
it an auth01ity for invasion of private right under the prete:l\.1; 
of the public good, which had no warrant in the laws or prac-
tices of our ancestors." 63 
This reasoning would seem to abandon the physical conception 
of property entirely in eminent domain cases, but the opinion 
limits the holding to cases "where real estate is actually invaded 
by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other ma-
teiial or by having any artificial sh·ucture placed on it, so as to 
effectually desh·oy or impair its usefulness." ct Thus the physi-
cal concept is preserved to the extent of requiring u physical 
invasion of the land, and the case is distinguished by the same 
60ibid. 25. 
61Ibid. 35. 
s213 Wall. (80 U. S.) 166 (1871). 
63 Ibid. 177. 
64 Ibid. 181. 
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court in a later case upon the ground that in it there was "a 
physical invasion of the real estate of the private. owner, and a 
practical ouster of his possession." o:. 
The course of the later decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court dealing with the overflow of land, is as follows: In United. 
States v. Lynah, in 1903,66 it was held that there had been a taldng 
of the petitioners' rice plantation when an overflow, resulting 
from works in the improvement of navigation on the Savannah 
River, had turned it into an irreclaimable bog. It was pointed out 
that even in the improvement of navigation or the performance of 
other public duties the government could not appropriate property 
without being under the obligation imposed by the Fifth AmendM 
ment to make compensation. 67 As to the facts of the particular 
case it was said : "While the government does not directly proM 
ceed to appropriate the title, yet it takes away the use and value; 
when that is done it is of little consequence in whom the fee 
may be vested." 68 As instances of cases where there had been 
no taking, Mr. Justice Brewer distinguished a case in which 
access to land abutting on a navigable river had been destroyed 
by the construction of a pier on the submerged land in front of 
the upland, 69 and another in which a riparian proprietor had 
been deprived of the use of her landing for the shipment of 
products from her farm for the greater part of the gardening 
season. 70 A District Court case involving overflow from the 
same improvements, but in which the injury could be remedied 
at an alleged expense of $10,000, was distinguished upon the 
ground that damage to such a limited extent constituted only 
consequential injury.71 It was admitted that theoretically there 
is no limit to what engineering skill might accomplish, but it was 
made a "practical matter" of degree how far the damage would 
have to go to constitute a taking.72 
65 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 642 (1878), In thia 
case the plaintiff complained of obstruction of access to its lot during tho 
construction of a tunnel under the Chicago River. It was held that thoro 
had been no taking of the plaintiff's property, that any work authorized 
by law could not constitute a nuisance, and that the city wns exempt :from 
liability in the proper performance of the work ns tho agent of the stnto 
in the performance of a public function. It was pointed out that, unlilto 
the Pumpelly case, there had been no invasion of the plaintiff's lot, that 
all that had been done was "to render for a time its use more inconM 
venient." Ibid. • 
o6 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349 (1903). 
o1 Ibid. 4'11, 23 Sup. Ct. at 357. 
os Ibid. 470, 23 Sup. Ct. at 357. It was held that when tho componsa· 
tion was paid the fee and the riparian rights passed to tho government. 
G9 Ibid. 472, 23 Sup. Ct. at 357, discussing Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 
141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48 (1900). 
70 Ibid. 473, 23 Sup. Ct. at 358, discussing Gibson v. United States, 100 
U. S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct. 578 (1897). 
7
.1 Ibid. 473, 23 Sup. Ct. at 358, discussing Mills v. United States, 40 
Fed. 738 (S.D. Ga. 1891). 
72 Ibid. 474, 23 Sup. Ct. at 358. Three members of the court dlssontetl 
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A year later, Bedford v. United States 13 was decided. The 
effect of revetments erected by the government for the improve-
ment of navigation had been to prevent the 1\Iississippi River 
from gradually lessening, through natural causes, the force of 
the current directed against the claimants' land. A tract of 2300 
acres was being eroded, and had been overflowed for a number 
of years. The Pwnpelly and Lynah cases were distinguished 
upon the ground that in them there had been "an actual inv:1sion 
and appropriation of the land as distinguished from conEcquen-
tial damage." 74 The claimants were denied compensation, 1\Ir. 
Justice l\:IcKenna saying: 
"In the case at bar the damage v,;as sh·ictly consequential. 
It was the result of the action of the river through a course of 
years. The case at bar, therefore, is distinguishable from the 
Ly1w.h case in the cause and manner of the injury. In the Lynah 
case the works were constructed in the bed of the rh·er, ob-
structed the natural flow of its water, and '"ere held to have 
caused, as a direct consequence, the overflow of Lynah's planta-
tion. In the case at bar the works ''·ere constructed along the 
banks of the river and their effect was to resist erosion of the 
banks by the waters of the river. There was no other interfer-
ence with natural conditions. Therefore, the damage to appel-
lants' land, if it can be assigned to the works at all, was but an 
incidental consequence of them." '; 
The following year, in Il!aniga.ult 'l'. Springs,'6 where an over-
flow to a "minor extent" was involved, it. was again held that 
there is no taking where the plaintiff is "merely put to some 
e~'ira e~'}>ense." 77 
upon the ground that there had been no overflowing, but only nn inter-
ference with drainage, which constituted only consequential damage. It 
was said in the dissenting opinion that if it were to be held that t11ere 
bad been an overflowing, there still had been no taking of the property, 
as the overflowing could have been stopped by raising the embankment 
surrounding the plantation. Ib:d. 484, 23 Sup. Ct. at 3G2. Mr. Justice 
1\!cKenna did not participate in the decision. 
73192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. 238 (1904). 
74 Ibid. 225, 24 Sup. Ct. at 240. 
75 Ibid. 224, 24 Sup. Ct. at 240. 
76199 U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 127 (1905). 
77 Ibid. 484, 26 Sup. Ct. at 132. In Jackson v. United States, ::!30 U. S. 
1, 33 Sup. Ct. 1011 (1913), it was held that it was not open to the peti-
tioners, who bad built a levee to protect their own land, to claim that the 
same land had been partially taken because the effect of the general system 
of construction of levees along the l\Iississippi River was to keep v:at\.'r 
from escaping from the river during high water periods, and thus to in-
crease the pressure against the petitioners' levee. It seems clear that this 
decision represented sound social policy. Everyone along the river should 
be required to engage in "team work'' to curb the annual flood menace, and 
there should be no complaint in regard to what others reasonably may 
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In United States v. Cress, decided in 1917,78 it appeared that 
land had been subjected to "a permanent liability to intermittent 
but inevitably recurring overflows" through the construction of 
locks and dams to improve navigation. It was argued that there 
had been no taking of the land because it had been depreciated 
in value only fifty per cent. Mr. Justice Pitney said, in reply 
to this, that "it is the character of the invasion, not the amount 
of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, 
that determines the question whether it is a taking." 10 It was 
held that there had been a partial taking, for which compensation 
must be made. The amount involved was comparatively small/t' 
and ·the question whether the plaintiff could have prevented tho 
loss through protective engineering works was not discussed. 
In another case it was held that where land was flooded by a 
government irrigation reservoir there could be no recovery be-
cause of destruction of the business conducted upon the land, or 
because of the enforced sale of cattle.81 Mr. Justice McReynolds 
assigned as the reason for this, that "there was no actual tnldng 
of these things by the United States, and consequently no basis 
for an implied promise to make compensation." 82 
The latest pronouncement of the court upon the question is 
that of Mr. Justice Sutherland, in 1924, that in order to con-
stitute a taking "it is, at least, necessary th{l.t the overflow be 
the di;rect result of the structure, and constitute an actual, per-
manent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of 
and not merely an injury to the property." 83 
If an attempt be made to reconcile these cas(ls, it may be said 
that the position of the United States Supreme Court is that 
in order· that a flooding of land may constitute a taking, it is 
necessary that the following requirements be satisfied: that the 
physical facts involved be not too complicated ;84 that there be a 
do in that regard. If it were desirable, it would not be feasible to dis-
tribute such losses. 
78 243 U. S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380 (1917). 
79 Ibid. 328, 37 Sup. Ct. at 385. 
so Fifty per cent of the value of the overflowed land was $495. In addi-
tion the plaintiff was held entitled to recover $500 because of tho dostruc-
tion of a ford, and the parties in a companion case covered by tho opinion 
were awarded $1500 because of the cutting off of the water power of a mtll. 
81 Bothwell v. United States, 254 U. S. 231, 41 Sup. Ct. 74 (1920). 
82 Ibid. 233, 41 Sup. Ct. at 75. To the same effect, Mitchell v. United 
States, 267 U. S. 341, 45 Sup. Ct. 293 (1925) (not an overflow case). 
sa Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146, 149, 44 Sup. Ct. 204, 205 
(1924). In this case the court felt that upon the facts the most that could 
be said in favor of the claimant was that land which previously had been 
subject to periodical overflows had probably been subjected to somo in-
creased flooding. 
84 Witness the quoted distinction between the Lynah and Bedford cases, 
in the latter decision, supra note 75. 
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permanent or intermittent physical invasion of the land; that the 
loss substained be substantial, and not relate to a business con-
ducted upon the land; and that the situation be such that the 
landowner cannot obviate the loss through protective engineer-
ing works with a reasonable expenditure of funds.s:; 
It was held, by the same court, that compensation is necessary 
when a franchise is taken.80 This is a recognition of intangibles, 
but 1\:Ir. Justice Brewer, in a dict-um, argues for the retention 
of a strictly objective point of view in dealing with questions 
1·elating to property under the Fifth Amendment. He bases 
his -contention upon the language used in the Constitutional pro-
vision: 
· "And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the 
property, and not to the owner. Every other clause in this Fifth 
Amendment is personal. 'No person shall be held to answer for 
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,' etc. Instead of continu-
ing that form of statement, and saying that no person shall be 
deprived of his property without just compensation, the per-
sonal element is left out, and the 'just compensation' is to be a 
full equivalent for the property taken." 81 " 
The cases which have been considered, recognizing a so-called 
destruction as a taking, have gotten away from the most nar1·ow 
physical viewpoint, that, in order to constitute a taking, the pos-
session of land or other tangible objects must be removed from 
the owner and appropriated by the taking authority. But un-
less a further advance is made, many cases of serious loss to 
the individual will still remain uncompensated. The courts are 
left in the position thus stated oracularly in a Maryland case: 
"Every taking involves an injury of some kind, though every 
injury does not include a taking." ss And, while physicallimit.'1-
tions are retained in the methods of thought, a determination as 
to which injuries are to be considered takings, and thus receive 
compensation, will not be- reached, as it should be, upon consider-
ss Mr. District Judge Grubb, after discussing the United Srotes Supreme 
C-ourt flooding cases, reaches the following conclusion: "A fair construc-
tion of these decisions leads to the conclusion that, in order that a flooding 
of lands may constitute a 'taking,' it must be not only a direct physical 
· invasion of private pr.Qperty, but must also act as an actual ouster and 
cause a practical destruction of the value of the land.'' Coleman v. Unitfld 
States, 181 Fed. 599, 603 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1910). The cnses are re\'iewed 
in Walls v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 482 (1909), and Tompkins v. United 
States, 45 Ct. Cl. 66 (1910). 
ss Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United Stat.es, supra note 54. 
87 Ibid. 326, 13 Sup. Ct. at 626. In addition to the franchise, tangible 
property was taken. 
88 Mr. Justice McSherry, in Garrett v. Lake Roland E. Ry., 79 1\ld. 277, 
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ations having to do with the social policy of eminent domain 
proceedings, or relating to practical expediency. The decision 
will turn upon the accidental presence or absence, along the lines 
already pointed out, of certain physical facts. 
The leading case taking another step, and treating the emi~ 
nent domain process as one of interference with valuable legal 
relations, is Eaton v. B. G. & 111. R. R.,89 decided by the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire in 1872, the year following the Pump· 
elly decision. The facts involved were again those of overflow,Po 
The opinion was written by the learned Mr. Justice Jeremiah 
Smith, later the distinguished professor of law at Harvard. Tho 
opinion is as able as it is long, and is perhaps the best known 
and most influential of those written by him.01 He said: 
"The vital issue then is, whether the injuries complained of 
amount to a taking of the plaintiff's property, within the consti· 
tutional meaning of those terms. It might seem that to state 
such a question is to answer it; but an examination of the auw 
thorities reveals a decided conflict of opinion. The constitutional 
prohibition (which exists in most, or all, of the States) has 
received, in some quarters, a construction which renders it of 
comparatively little worth, being interpreted much as if it read,-
'No person shall be divested of the formal title to property with· 
out compensation, but he may, without compensation, be deprived 
of all that makes the title valuable.' To constitute a 'taking of 
property', it seems to have sometimes been held necessary that 
there.should be 'an exclusive appropriation', a 'total assumption 
of possession', 'a complete ouster', an absolute or total conver~ 
tion of the entire property, a 'taking the property altogether'. 
These views seem to us to be founded on a misconception of 
the meaning of the term 'property', as used in the various State 
constitutions.'' 92 
He proceeds to point out that "in a strict legal sense, land is 
not 'property,' but the subject of property;" that while the term 
"property" is, in common parlance, frequently applied to a tract 
of land or a chattel, in its legal signification it t•efers to legal 
relations. Interference with those relations, he continues, takes 
the owner's property.93 If the defendants were correct in thoir 
282, 29 Atl. 830, 832 (1894). 
so 51 N. H. 504 (1872). 
90 It was stated that at times the water carried sand, gravel, and stones 
upon the plaintiff's land. 
91 
"In this masterly essay on the nature of property, the force of nn un· 
constitutional statute, and the meaning of a 'taking' by eminent domain, 
Judge Smith established the law as it is generally hold today upon nn 
imp:regnable basis." Beale, Jeremiah Smith (1921) 35 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2. 
92 Eaton v. B. C. & M. R.R., snpra note 89, at 611. 
9 3 He also reasoned that if the land itself were to be considered the prop-
erty, the practical result would be the same, as it would have to be inferred 
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contention that they had a right to flood the plaintiff's land, they 
''"ould have an easement in it. But an easement is property, and 
could have been acquired by the defendants only tlu·ough sub-
traction from the legal relations constituting the plaintiff's 
property. This the constitution does not permit without compen-
sation. The plaintiff having received no compensation for the 
easement, 94 it does not exist, and the plaintiff is entitled to his 
damages.9 :; 
The doctrine of the Eaton case was applied in another over-
flow case, in the same court, in an opinion written by 1\:Ir. Justice 
Charles Doe, "one of the greatest of our American judges." !)r. He 
said: 
"Property in land must be considered, for many purposes, not 
as an absolute, unrestricted dominion, but as an aggregation of 
qualified privileges, the limits of which are prescribed by the 
equality of rights, and the correlation of rights and obligations 
necessary for the highest enjoyment of land by the entire com-
munity of proprietors .... Property is taken, when any one of 
those proprietary rights is taken, of which property consists." or 
Lewis quotes lVCr. Justice Doe at length with approval.03 
Nichols takes the opposite view.n~ He feels that it is "only by an 
e},._·:tremely technical argument" that the New Hampshire court is 
able to interpret the word "take" as it does, and that tlris is not 
a proper method of interpretation of the language of constitution 
that the framers of the constitution intended to protect the essentinl ele-
ments of ownership which give the property value, and not to protect "mere 
empty titles, or barren insignia of ownership.'' Ibid. 512. The damage 
was said to be "consequential," in the sense of having occurred following 
the lapse of a period of time after the defendants' acts, but was said to be 
what Sir William Erie had called "consequential damage to the actionable 
degree." Ibid. 513, citing Brand v. H. & C. Ry., L. R. 2 Q. B. 223, 249 
(1867). 
94 It was held that eminent domain proceedings previously directed 
against the plaintiff had related only to acts done by the defendants on the 
plaintiff's land, whereas the overflowing now complained of resulted from 
acts on the land of another. Ibid. 515. 
9S The suit was an action on the case to recover damages for a talting 
not covered by eminent domain proceedings. The New Hampshire {;Onsti-
tution contained no provision that private property should not be taken 
for public use without compensation, but the learned justice thought of 
the problem in those terms, and held that such a provision was to be im-
plied from the spirit and tenor of the whole instrument. Ibid. 510. There 
was a provision that no part of a man's property should be taken from 
him, or applied to public uses, without his consent. N. H. CONST. pt. 1, 
art. 12. 
96 Beale, op. cit. supra note 91, at 2. 
97 Thompson v. Androscoggin Co., 54 N. H. 545, 551 (1874). 
t~s 1 LEWIS, lJP· cit. supra. note 8, at 62. 
99 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note ·s, at 293 ff. 
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makers who used "an expression which, to the lay mind at least, 
meant something wholly different." 100 He states that the fallacy 
of the argument of the New Hampshire court ,.lies in its as· 
sumption that the property rights of an individual against other 
individuals are the same as they are against the public." 101 He 
contends that the constitutional provisions should be interpreted 
in the light of the law as it existed prior to their adoption, and 
therefore concludes that whatever one might think of the ab· 
stract logic of the Eaton case, it came ,.too late to stand on its 
merits as an interpretation of the constitution." tQJ 
Such a method of approach is to be criticized in that it is purely 
legalistic. It gives no consideration to the requirements of the 
social policy to be effected through eminent domain proceedings. 
It affords no opportunity for an advancing civilization, con· 
fronted with changing and more complicated conditions, to give 
effect to the social policy set forth in certain words, by using a 
more abstract conception in their interpretation than was re· 
quired in early times. Processes of growth and development in 
constitutional interpretation are utterly denied. The assumption 
of the New Hampshire justices, that the property rights of an 
individual against the public are the same as his rights against 
other individuals, seems to be entirely justified, as applied to the 
awarding of compensation in eminent domain proceedings.103 It 
is implicit in the nature of such proceedings that society desires 
to purchase from an individual the property rights recognized in 
him under a legal system designed to adjust his relations with 
other individuals. The only difference that should exist between 
a sale to society and one to an individual is that the former may 
acquire property that the latter could not buy. 
Before the Eaton case, Mr. Chief Justice Shaw of Massachtt· 
setts handed down the first decision holding that a railroad is 
entitled to compensation when its line is crossed by a highway. 
He said that if the public use of land or chattels deprived the 
owner of possession or "some beneficial enjoyment," his property 
had been "appropriated" to public use, and he was entitled to 
compensation.104 In the leading case of City of St. Louis v. llill, 
100 Ibid. 299. 
101Ibid, 297. 
1o.2Ibid. 301. Although disagreeing with the Eaton case, he stntes thnt 
the decision, "remarkable for its strength of logic and clearness o.f ron~ 
soning, attracted and retained the attention of the legal profession th1•ough-
out the country." Ibid. 296. 
1oasee note 189, infra. 
104 Old Colony and Fall River R.R. v. County of Plymouth, 14 Gray (80 
Mass.) 155, 161 (1859). 
In 1874 the leading case of Grand Rapids Booming Compnny v. Jarvis 
was decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan. This case involved facts 
of overflow. In a famous passage Mr. Justice Christinncy asked: "Of 
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a city ordinance imposing a building line resh·iction 'vas held 
invalid, because it constituted a taking of private property, even 
though "title to the property and the right to use the same are 
still in the defendant." 10:; 
In a New Jersey case, Pennsylvania R. R. t-•. A:ngcl, a similar 
holding was made in dealing with a nuisance from the operation 
of a railroad. 1\:Ir. Justice Di.xon said, in a ·widely quoted pa::sage: 
"\\Thether you flood the farmer's fields so that they cannot be 
cultivated, or pollute the bleacher's sh·eam so that his fabrics 
are stained, or fill one's dwelling with smells and noise so that it 
cannot be occupied in comfort, you equally take away the owner's 
property." 1o8 
In a similar case in the United States Supreme Court, 1\Ir. 
Justice Pitney said that while the legislature might legalize what 
otherwise would be a public nuisance, it could not "confer im-
munity from action for a private nuisance of such a character 
as to amount in effect to a taking of private property for public 
use." 107 The same court held on demurrer that it would con-
stitute a taking of land for the government to install a battery 
in a fort for the purpose of firing projectiles at will across the 
area in time of peace.10s 
Title consists of an aggregate of valuable legal relations vested 
in the person called the owner.1w Throughout legal history it has 
been the practice to treat as separate entities for legal and com-
mercial purposes certain sub-groups of legal relations included 
within the aggregate known as title. Due to the methods of 
thought thus historically developed, the courts have had no dif-
ficulty in recognizing as a taking of property any interference 
with such a sub-group of legal relations. Here property has 
always been looked at from a legal relations standpoint. This 
applies to situations where easements 110 or profits a prendre 111 
what does property practically consist, but of the incidents which the law 
has recognized as attached to the title, or right of property? Is not the 
idea of property in, or title to lands, apart from, and stripped of all its 
incidents, a purely metaphysical abstraction, as immaterial and useless tiJ 
the owner as 'the stuff that dreams are made of'? Is it not n much less 
injury to him, if it can injure him at all, to deprive him of this abstrac-
tion, than of the incidents of property, which alone render it practicably 
valuable to him'Z" 30 Mich. 308, 320 (1874). 
1o.; 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861 (1893). 
10814 Stewart (14 N. J. Eq.) 316, 329 (1886). 
101 Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. l.i4G, l.iu3, ::a Sup. Ct. 
654, 657 (1914). 
tos Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327, 
43 Sup. Ct. 135 (1922). 
1o9 HoHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 162. 
no 1 LEwis, op. cit: supra, note 8, at 428; 1 NICHOLS. op. cit. supra, note 
6, at 346. As to violation of restrictions in deeds, see Note (1930) 19 
CALIF. L. REV. 58. 
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have been obstructed, or where in effect easements have been 
imposed on land in favor of the public, as through building line u:l 
or zoning l·estrictions 113 (not justified under the police power), or 
where there has been interference with riparian rights.114 In an 
oft-cited passage Mr. Justice Pitney stated that the right to 
have water flow away from a mill dam unobstructed, except as 
in the course of nature, "is not a mere easement or appurtenance, 
but exists by the law of nature as an inseparable part of the 
land." 11" Franchises, also, have been a historically recognized 
species of property, and it has never been doubted that componM 
sation i's required whenever they are taken.110 There should be 
no doubt in regard to other forms of con~racts.117 
Licenses are not protected against obstruction by third parties, cithor 
in eminent domain or other connections. 2 LEWIS, op. cit. sttpra note 8, 
at 958; 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 340, 353; 2 TIFFANY, REAL 
PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) 1202, 1391. For a criticism of tho failure to 
afford protection, see Note (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 642, discussing Taft v. 
Bridgeton Worsted Co., 246 Mass. 444, 141 N. E. 119 (1923). Eminent 
domain cases are: Clapp v. City of Boston, 133 Mass. 367 (1882); Elliott 
v. Mason, 76 N. H. 229, 81 Atl. 701 (1911) ; Gorgas v. Philadelphia, H. & 
P. Ry., 144 Pa. St. 1, 22 Atl. 715 (1891) ; Strickland v. Pennsylvania R.R., 
154 Pa. St. 348, 26 Atl. 431 (1893) ; Municipal Freehold Land Co. v. Mot• 
ropolitan and District Railways Joint Committee, 1 Cab. & E. 184 (Q, B. 
1883); Bird v. Great Eastern Ry., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 268 (C. P. 1865) (not 
"interest in land", under statute)·; Frank Wl.rr & Co., Ltd. v. London 
County Council, L. R. 1 K. B. 713 (1904) (not "interest in land", under 
statute). Contm: Miller v. Greenwich, 33 Vr. (62 N. J. L.) 771, 42 Atl. 
735 (1899). In Holt v. Gas Light and Coke Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 728 (1872) 1 
two tracts of land, not adjoining, had been used as a shooting range, by 
reason of a license for hire to shoot over the intervening land. One of tho 
tracts was taken. It was held that the possibility of continuance of tho 
license should be taken into consideration in assessing the damages in re-
gard to the tract not taken, the statute permitting compensation whon land 
not taken was injuriously affected. The court did not feel that it was 
awarding compensation for the enforced discontinuance of the lict>nae liS 
such. 
111 2 LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 957; 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. 81tpl'a ll(ltO 
6, at 352. 
112 1 LEWIS, 433; 1 NICHOLS, 280. As to height of buildings, sec 1 
LEWIS, 468; 1 NICHOLS, 277. 
113 1 LEWIS, at 469; 1 NICHOLS, 278. As to other regulations, see 1 
LEWIS, 467 ff.; 1 NICHOLS, 271 ff. 
114 1 LEWIS, 69 ff.; 1 NICHOLS, 404 ff. The police power as applied to 
l'iparian rights is generally denominated the power to improve nnvigati(ln, 
'L'he same thought has been expressed by saying that land held by indi· 
\'idual owners "is always subject to the servitude in respect of navigation 
:reated in favor of the Federal government by the Constitution". Mr. 
• :hief Justice Fuller, in Gibson v. United States, supra note 70, at 272, 
1'7 Sup. Ct. at 579. 
m United States v. Cress, suprct note 78, at 330, 37 Sup. Ct. at 386. 
116 1\Ionongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, supra note 54; 1 LEJWlS, 
!tl7 ff.; 1 NICHOLS, 68, 361 ff. • 
m Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106, 44 Sup. Ct. 
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It has sometimes been provided by statute, that if a city files 
a plat indicating the location of future streets, no compensation 
can be secured for buildings thereafter erected upon the land 
thus claimed for street purposes. Under a physical conception 
of property, the filing of such a plat does not constitute a taking 
of the land. There has been no semblance of a physical invasion 
or interference. From the standpoint of legal relations, ho\...-ever, 
there has been a very serious change in the owner's position. It 
was held in Pennsylvania that under such circumstances there 
was no taking.118 The position of the doctrine has been greatly 
weakened in that state, 11\) and in other jurisdictions there has 
been agreement that such action constitutes a talting of 
471 (1924); Russian Volunteer Fleet v~ United States, 282 U. S. 481, 51 
Sup. Ct. 229 (1931); (1931) 4 So. CALIF. REV. 320; 2 LEWIS, 745; 1 
NICHOLS, 68. In McGrath v. Boston, 103 1\lass. 369 (1869), the plaintiff 
occupied certain land under a written instrument which the court inter-
preted to be an executory contract with the owner of the fee, and not a 
lease. The defendant city gave notice of intention to take a part of the 
premises. Sh: months later, during the period covered by the contract, a 
new owner of the fee, to whom it had been conveyed by the one vlith whom 
the plaintiff had his contract, gave the plaintiff notice to quit, and removed 
the plaintiff's furniture. The court states that the plaintiff then moved 
out. The city did not enter until over nine months aft-er the plaintiff's 
removal. The plaintiff paid rent up to the date of the notice to quit. The 
plaintiff was refused compensation upon the ground that he did not have 
any interest in the land. The result reached seems to be correct, as it 
seems that under the circumstances the breach of the plaintiff's contract 
was too remote a consequence of the city's action to be properly attribut-
able to it, and that, as stated by the court, the plaintiff's remedy was to 
seek his damages upon the contract. In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United 
States, sztpra note 54, impossibility of performance of a contract was a 
legally remote consequence of e.."ercise of the war powers, and compenrn-
tion was therefore properly denied. In Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. 
Boston and Providence Ry. Corp., 209 :Mass. 298, 306, 95 N. E. 887, 890 
(1911)', it was held that in awarding compensation to a lessee the value 
of an option to purchase could not be taken into consideration. It was 
held that the option did not constitute an estate in the land, but was only 
a contract right, which in equity shifted to the fund produced by the con-
demnation award to the lessor. A statut-e provided for payment of the 
fund to a trustee in this contingency. The decision seems correct. 
Whatever the nature of the property interests in a corpse may be, it 
bas been held that they cannot be ntade the subject of eminent domain 
proceedings. University of Louisville v. Metcalfe, 216 Ky. 339, 387 S. W. 
945 (1926). 
ns In the matter of the District of the City of Pittsburgh, 2 W. & S. 
220 (Pa. 1841); Forbes Street, 70 Pa. St. 125 (1871); Bush v. McKeesport 
City, 166 Pa. St. 57, 30 Atl. 1023 (1895). 
mIn Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. St. 257, 95 Atl. 429 (1915), the 
-court indicates an intention to limit the earlier cases to situations where 
the filing of the plat is a net benefit to the O'\Yner of the land, through 
-enabling him to know where the future channels of travel and transporta-
tion will be located. 
244 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41 
property.120 The almost complete unanimity of the courts in this 
connection no doubt has been due to the obviously serious char-
acter of the effect of such a situation upon the usability or 
salability of the owner's title. 
When the Illinois constitution of 1870 was framed, an attempt 
was made to insure protection to condemnees, in spite of the 
physical conception of property so largely used by the courts, 
by ·inserting the words "or damaged" after the word "taken" 
in the usual constitutional provision, so as to read, that private 
property shall not be taken "or damaged" for public use without 
just compensation.121 Similar provisions have now been adopted 
in the constitutions of a majority of the states.122 In opening the 
debate upon this provision in the constitutional convention, Mr. 
William H. Underwood, advo~ating its adoption, said: 
"The courts have decided that cities in their grading, may cut 
down lots so as to almost ruin men and subject them to enor-
mous expense, or they may raise the grade of streets so as to 
cause water to run upon lots, and make property comparatively 
worthless, but that that is a damage for which lot-owners are 
entitled to no compensation. That seems the settled law of the 
land; so decided in several states, and by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. They say it is not taking property, but is an 
incidental damage which lot-owners must sustain, by reason of 
these public improvements, and for which they are entitled to 
no compensation. As I understand this article, it will require 
compensation to be made for those damages which necessarily 
and naturally rise to a party in consequence of these public 
improvements." 123 
The debates indicate that the framers of -the Illinois Constitu· 
tion were greatly influenced by the use of the word "damage" 
in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act,124 and its judicial inter· 
pretation in England.m 
The leading decision interpreting such a provision as that of 
the Illinois Constitution is Rigney v. City of Chicago,12° decided 
12o 1 LEWIS, 431; 1 NICHOLS, 282. 
121 ILL. CONS'!'. (1870), art. 2, sec. 13. 
122 2 NICHOLS, 844. 
123 2 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE S'l'AT.fj OF 
ILLINOIS (1870) 1577. 
124 Ibid. 1578. See Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Viet. c. 18, 
§§ 18, 49 (1845). This act requires that compensation be paid for tho 
lands purchased, and also "for the damage, if any, to be sustained by tho 
owner of the lands by reason of tpe severing of the lands taken from the 
other lands of such owner, or otherwise injuriously affecting such 
lands ..•. " 
125 The English law as to compensation for injurious affection of lands, 
as developed under this and other acts, is set forth in 6 HALSBURY, LAWS 
OF ENGLAND (1909) 43 ff. 
126 102 Ill. 64 (1882). 
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by the Supreme Court of lllinois in 1882. The plaintiff was 
awarded compensation because of obstruction of access to a 
street through the erection of a viaduct. Thir. Justice Mulkey, in 
the opinion of the court, three of the seven justices dissenting, 
points out that under the previously existing constitutional pro-
vision in lllinois, of the usual type, an "actual physical invasion" 
of property was required.127 His reasoning proceeds: While an 
actual appropriation or taking was not required, it being enough 
that the injury was direct and physical, nevertheless many cases 
of great hardship were excluded, such as the case at bar. Under 
the old provision, it was the view of the Illinois courts that "any 
direct physical injury to the property" of an individual, by means 
of which he was substantially deprived of its ordinary use and en-
joyment, was a taking. Under the amended provision the re-
quirement of physical injury is not abandoned. There has been, 
however, ambiguity in tile judicial statements of the Dlinois 
courts as to the facts necessary to constitute physical injury, be-
cause of the use by the courts of the term "property'' in this con-
nection. This ambiguity can be obviated, and the change in the 
constitution given proper effect, by adopting the conception of 
property as consisting of legal relations. Therefore, he con-
cludes, "under the present constitution it is sufficient if there 
is a direct physical obstruction or injury to the right of user or 
enjoyment, by which the mvner sustains some special pecuniary 
damage in excess of that sustained by the public generally." t::s 
It seems unfortunate that the court should retain a physical 
requirement in the test for· an obstruction or injury to 'vhat it 
so carefully points out are intangibles, and the opinion indicates 
the difficulty in abandoning physical concepts in habits of 
thought. Just what the court has in mind in requiring a "direct 
physical obstruction or injury" to legal relations is not clear. It 
is not discussed in the opinion, and is not made clear in other 
cases.129 Other parts of the opinion would seem to eliminate the 
127 Ibid. 74. 
12s Ibid. 72, 78. At another place in the opinion the requirement is stated 
in somewhat different form. It is said that "to warrant a recovery it 
must appear there has been some direct physical disturbance of a right, 
either public or private, which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his 
property, and which gives to it an additional value, and that by reason of 
such disturbance he has sustained a special damage with respect to his 
property in excess of that sustained by the public generally." Ibid. 80. 
129 Halsbury states that "physical interference" is required. G lLU.SBUR\', 
op. cit. supm note 125,-at 32, 46. In Lambert v. Norfolk, lOS Va. 259, 
265, 61 S. E. 776, 778 (1908), it is stated that there must be physical 
damage to the corpus or to some appurtenant right, and that the dnmnge 
must be physical, not to the "feelings, tastes, or sentiments." Other ca:::es 
stating the requirement that the interference v:ith legal relations must be 
physical are: Austin v. Augusta Terminal Ry., 108 Ga. 671, 674, 31 S. E. 
852, 857 (1899) ; Illinois Power & Light Corporation v. Peterson, 3~~ Dl. 
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requirement. Possibly it is reasonable to conclude that the state-
ment of the requirement, while unfortunate from the stand-
point of lucidity of the concepts used in legal thinking, has pro-
duced no practical ill effects. It is pointed out in the opinion that 
the amended constitutional provision is not intended to reach 
every possible injury that may be occasioned by a public improve-
mentP0 This is obviously correct, as every injury sustained by 
an individual in an organized society is not legally remediable. 
Toward the end of the opinion the view of the English courts in 
construing the term "injuriously affected" is adopted, particu-
larly as set forth in McCarthy v. Metropolitan Board of Worlt:s.131 
It is therefore felt that "it was the intention of the framers of the 
present constitution to require compensation to be made in nil 
cases where, but for some legislative enactment, an action would 
lie by the common law." 132 This statement of principle, unlike 
the earlier portion of the opinion wh'ich has been ref~rred to, 
does not include any physical requirement. It treats the problem 
simply as one of working out principles of the law of damages in 
accordance with the social policy of eminent domain proceed-
ings.133 While the principles developed in other connections will 
not always afford a sufficient guide,134 certainly all possible bene-
342, 347, 153 N. E. 577, 579 (1926); East St. Louis Light & Power Co. v. 
Cohen, 333 Ill. 218, 222, 164 N. E. 182, 184 (1928); Stuhl v. Great North-
ern Ry., 136 Minn. 158, 161, 161 N. W. 501, 502 (1917); Gottschalk v. 
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 14 Neb. 550, 560, 16 N. W. 475, •179, 14 Nob. 561, 
17 N. W. 120 (1883); Haney v. G. C. & S. F. Ry, 3 Will. § 278, § 279 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1887). On the facts none of the cases cited throw any 
light upon the content of the requirement. 
130 Rigney v. City of Chicago, supra note 126, at 80. 
131 L. R. 7 C. P. 508 (1872). 
132 Rigney v. City of Chicago, supra note 126, at 81. 
133 A similar conclusion has been reached in interpreting such a provi-
sion in the constitution of another state. City of Tulsa v. Horwitz, 131 
Okla. 63, 65, 267 Pac. 852, 854 (1928). The opinion quotes with approval 
20 C. J. 674, to the effect that such a constitutional provision includes 41all 
damages or injuries arising fro·m the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain which cause a diminution in the value of private property, whether 
this results directly to the property, or is but an interference with tho 
:tight which the owner has to the legal and proper use of tho same." Seo 
City of Amarillo v. Tutor, 267 S. W. 697, 699 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1924). 
The encyclopedia immediately follows the quotation with an incorpora-
tion in its text of the requirement, "generally held," of a "physical inter-
ference." 
Dillon suggests that under such a constitutional provision recovery 
"must ..• be limited to cases where the co1·pus of the owner's property it-
self, or some appurtenant right or easement connected therewith or by the 
law annexed thereto, is directly (that is, in general, if not always, physi-
cally) affected, and is also specially affected (that is, in a manner not 
common to the property owner and to the public at large); and such direct 
and special injury must be such as to depreciate the value of tho owner's 
property". 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPCRATIONS (5th ed. 1911) 1610, 
134 For example, at common law, with few exceptions, a man may build 
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fit should be derived from the general law of damages wherever 
the situations presented are essentially analogous.m 
Nichols argues that the states which have failed to adopt con-
stitutional provisions in regard to "damaging" as well as "tak-
ing" property have indicated by such failure their deliberate 
choice of a physical conception of property in this connection.13n 
He therefore concludes that it is no longer open to question in 
those states that a "damaging" does not constitute a "taldng". 
This would mean that in such a state no court could ·with pro-
priety adopt for eminent domain purposes a conception of prop-
erty as consisting of legal relations. It is submitted that this 
viev;r is entirely erroneous, as it overlooks the difficulties to be 
encountered and the popular inertia to be overcome in securing 
any constitutional amendment.I~7 
It has been pointed out that under a legal relations conception 
of property a constitutional amendment adding "damaging" to 
"taldng" is unnecessary.m In this connection it has been sug-
gested, not only that the cases adopting a physical conception 
have been too narrow in giving a meaning to the term "prop-
erty'', but also that they have erred "in holding that the right 
of recovery rested upon the constitution, rather than upon the 
common law or upon an inherent right superior to any legis-
lative enactment." 13~ That portion of the argument which re-
lates to "inherent right" would be rejected by many modern 
thinkers, but the contention can ,..,.en stand 'Yithout that support. 
If the view that there is a principle of justice, apart from consti-
tutions, requiring compensation is adopted, the only effect of a 
constitutional provision in regard to compensation is to prevent 
the legislature from destroying the citizen's right to receive it. 
It has been suggested that when a "damaged" pl'O\'ision is 
any sort of an erection upon his own land. A different problem is pre-
sented when an erection is built in a street. 
13~ See note 175, infra. 
1361 NICHOLS, 306. 
• 137 In this connection the writer recalls an interesting round table dis-
cussion at one of the meetings of the Association of American Law Schools. 
Professor Edwin R. Keedy, of the University of Pennsylvania, outlined a 
number of needed reforms in the field of criminal procedure. Professor 
Edson R. Sunderland, of the University of Michigan, the great leader of 
the American bar in matters of procedural reform, opened the discussion 
with remarks commencing about as follows: "Why is it that l:lrr. Keedy 
can present in fifteen minutes reforms which we all agree are good, and 
which it would take about one hundred years to put into effect? The rea-
sons can all be summed up in one word-constitutions.'' 
1 3 8 l\ir. Justice Whiting, in Hyde v. Minnesota, Dakota & Pacific Ry., 
29 S.D. 220, 2:30. 136 N. W. 92, 95 (1912); Davis, Constitz!ticmal Pmt>ivitms 
Against Damaging Prirate Property (1902) 8 VA. L. REG. 525. 
139 Sea Hyde v. 1\Iinnesota, Dakota & Pacific Ry., supm note l:JS, at 2!JQ, 
136 N. W. at 95. Consult Grant, op. cit. supra note 3. 
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added, "taking" should be restricted to cases where the owne1· is 
deprived of title.14° Frequently constitutions require payment of 
compensation in advance in case of a taking, but not in connec-
tion with a damaging.141 For this purpose there are practical 
considerations in support .of a distinction based upon the im-
portance of the legal relations affected. There is also more liber-
ality in granting injunctive relief in connection with acts con-
sidered takings than with those thought of as only amounting to 
the infliction of damage.142 A distinction here based upon the ex-
tent of the consequences of the contemplated action is in har-
mony with fundamental principles of the law of injunctions. 
The problem of the nature of the conception to be used in ad-
ministering eminent domain proceedings has sometimes been 
presented in· situations where there unquestionably has occurred 
a taking of property, under either of the concepts discussed. A 
question has arisen as to what parties are to be recognized as 
having property interests entitling them to compensation, or it 
has been necessary to determine how far the property interests 
of those receiving compensation extend.143 In the solution of any 
problem, the selection of the persons to receive compensation, 
and of the elements of loss or injury to be taken into considera-
tion in assessing damages, is a measure of the extent of property. 
It is settled that life tenants and tenants for years Ol' from 
year to year are entitled to compensation.144 On the other hand, 
it seems clear that tenants by sufferance and trespassers have no 
legal relations entitling them to compensation.115 It generally 
has been so held in regard to tenants at will.140 This result has 
Ho Mr. Justice Crow, in Milwaukee Terminal Ry. v. City of Seattle, SG 
Wash. 102, 107, 149 Pac. 644, 646 (1915). See Fenton v. City of Seattle, 
132 Wash. 194, 198, 231 Pac. 795, 796 (1925). The distinction is jurlsdic· 
tiona! in the Court of Claims. In connection with a taking there is an 
implied contract to pay, and jurisdiction. A damaging constitutes only 
a tort, when there is no jurisdiction. Sanguinetti v. United States, 55 Ct. 
CI. 107 (1920), aff'd, cit. supra note 83; cf. State of Alabama "· United 
States, 282 U.S. 502, 51 Sup. Ct. 225 (1931). 
141 1 NICHOLS, 307. 
142 2 LEWIS, 1611. 
143 See Matter of City of N. Y. (Manhattan Ry.) 126 Misc. 879, 216 N. 
Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1926); modified, 229 App. Div. 617, 243 N. Y. Supp. 
665 (1st Dep't 1930); Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 779; Nelles, A Construe· 
tive "Property Right" and Its "Value" (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1074; Corbin, 
The Elevated Rail1.pay Condemnation Case-Ancither Atwlysis of tho 
Property Interests involved (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1039. This case pro· 
sents the interesting and novel question whether, upon co;ndemnation of an 
elevated railroad in a city street, the railway company is entitled to com-
pensation for the right to impair light, air, and access. 
144 2 LEWIS, 952; 1 NICHOLS, 338. 
145 1 NICHOLS, 340, 343. 
HG United States v. Inlots, Fed. Cas. No. 15,441a (S. D. Ohio, 1873}; 
E!Jlerson v. City of Somerville, 166 Mass. 115, 44 N. E. 110 (1896); Hannn 
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been reached, apparently, either upon the theory that a tenancy 
at will has no market value, or upon the technical theory that the 
nature of the estate is such as to render impossible its consider-
ation in eminent domain proceedings. 
The facts of one of the cases denying compensation to tenants 
at will 147 present the question whether such a holding accomp-
lishes, as far as is practicable, the social purpose of eminent do-
main proceedings to prevent loss to condemnees. The tenants at 
\Vlll were liquor dealers, renting from a brewer. They purchased 
their beer from the landlord, and as 1·ent paid him twenty-five 
cents per barrel more than the usual price. The tenants had re-
lied upon the arrangement sufficiently, and had considered it of 
·enough value, to erect a number of buildings upon the land. It 
was a reasonable inference that the lessor was profiting by the 
arrangement, and that, as a practical matter, he would have per-
mitted it to continue indefinitely if condemnation had not inter-
vened. It was held that termination of the lessor's estate by con-
demnation proceedings determined the lease of the tenants at 
will, and made them tenants at sufferanc:e of the condemning au-
thority, and they were refused compensation. It was said, by 
way of dictwn, that the change in the nature of the tenancy was 
not of any practical importance, as all that they were entitled 
to in any event was notice, and a reasonable time to remo\·e their 
goods and fi:\.-tures. 
Looking at the situation from the standpoint of the legal rela-
tions of the human beings involved, the lessees had a conditional 
privilege to continue to use the premises, subject to a power of 
revocation in the landlord. They had a right that they should 
not be interfered with before such revocation. The question 
presented is whether, assuming that a financial value to the 
lessees is involved, it is not practicable, in eminent domain pro-
ceedings, to recognize such legal relations as constituting prop-
erty, fOl~which compensation should be made. Such action does 
not call for reduction of the compensation to be paid the land-
v. County of Hampden, 250 Mass. 107, 145 N. E. 258 (1924) ; Lyons v. 
Philadelphia & R. Ry., 209 Pa. St. 550, 58 Atl. 924 (190.!); Canadian 
Pacific R. W. Co. v. Brown :Milling Co., 18 Ont. L. Rep. 81> (1909) (not 
"person interested," under Canadian act). Contm: Sheehan v. City of 
Fall River, 187 :Mass. 356, 73 N. E. 544 (1905) ; Cole v. Ellwood Power Co., 
216 Pa. 283, 65 Atl. 678 (1907). Sheehan v. City of Fnll River is unlil;e 
the other cases cited in this note in that the tenancy at will continued to 
exist. The grade of a street was changed, under a statute providing for 
t}le payment of "all damages sustained by any person in his property." 
The lessee was awarded damages because of injury to a building which, 
as between her and the owner of the fee, was a tenant's ib .. -ture, rubject 
to removal. She also received compensation because of tempornry inter-
ference with access. A settlement by the condemning authority v.ith the 
landowner -had not included her damages. 
147 Lyons v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., sup;-a note 14G. 
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lord, as the presence of satisfied tenants does not lessen the 
market value of the premises or their value to him. 
If the condemning authority secures a conveyance from the 
owner of the fee, the problem is still in substance the same. Such 
a conveyance is voluntary only in the sense that the owner is 
willing to submit gracefully, rather than to await condemnation 
proceedings. The question remains, whether, as matter of sound 
social policy, compensation should not be paid to the tenant at 
will because of the proximate effect of such action upon his logal 
relations. It may seem that an affirmative answer will mean that 
a condemning authority will be required to pay more to secure 
land than a private individual. It may be said that while the 
latter can purchase from the owner of the fee and let the owner 
terminate the tenancy, the condemning authority will have to 
make payment to both parties. But while the private purchaser 
will have only one payment to make, in the bargaining process 
he will not have the assistance of a threat of eminent domain 
proceedings. It is therefore doubtful whether, in the long run, 
the condemning authority will be out more than the private 
buyer. Even though an additional payment is required, there is 
still reason for holding that the legal relations of the parties 
should be adjusted in this way. Forced transactions and volun-
tary ones are not the same. A valuable economic situation is cre-
ated when land is occupied by satisfied tenants, regardless of the 
character of the legal tenure. Both landlords and tenants pay 
brokers substantial sums to create such situations, and no suffi-
cient reason is seen why courts should be blind to them. If both 
landlord and tenant sustain losses, both should be awarded com-
pensation .. 
The practical situation is essentially the same where, as the 
result of condemnation proceedings against the landlord (or pur-
chase by the condemning authority from him), a tenant from 
year to year is given the required notice to quit. Lord Tender-
den's reasoning in awarding compensation to such a tenant 1411 
under the Hungerford Market Act 149 is capable of wide applica-
14s Ex Pa1·te Farlow, 2 B. & Ad. 3';11 (K. B. 1831). King v. Hungerford 
Market Co. (Ex Parte Still), 4 B. & Ad. 592 (K. B. 1833). Acctn'd, as to 
tenant ousted at expiration of fixed term, King v. Hungerford Market Co. 
(Ex Parte Gosling), 4 B. & Ad. 596 (K. B. 1833). 
149 Loc. & Pers. Pub. Acts 11 GEo. IV c. 70 (1830), The language of 
this statute differs from the American constitutional provisions. In § 19 
it specifically includes tenants at will and occupiers among those entitled 
to compensation, and provides, inter alia, for the pay'ment of compensation 
to any person who "shall or may sustain or be put unto any loss, damage, 
or injury, in respect of any interest whatsoever, for good-will, improve-
ments, tenant's fixtures, or otherwise, which they may now enjoy by l'cnson 
of the passing of this Act." From a legal relations standpoint it is be· 
lieved that these differences, except as to the reference to occupiers (who, 
as such, probably would not have any legal relations which otherwise 
1931] EIIIINENT DOMA.IN 251 
tion. He said : 
"Now it seems perfectly clear that if this act had not passed, 
the tenants and occupiers would not have been all dispossessed, 
as they will be under the act. It is said 'the interest which they 
now enjoy' must be taken to mean a legal interest, and th .. '\t all 
legal interest was determined by the notice to quit. But I think 
this is not the fair meaning of the words, and that they must be 
understood as signifying that sort of right which an occupier 
ordinarily has, of parting with his tenancy to another person 
for such sum as he may be induced to give for goodYdll, fb ... "tures, 
and improvements, and which is often very considerable though 
the tenancy be only from year to year, where there is a confidence 
that it ·will not be put an end to. Tlus interest, feeble as it may 
be (since it is always determinable at a short notice), may justly 
be considered as matter of value to the owner, and to any other 
party who becomes the purchaser.1G0 
In a Maryland case a tenant who had had a number of suc-
cessive leases, each for a term of one year, was awarded compen-
sation for loss of the possibility of renewal. 1\Ir. Justice Bryan 
said: 
"The evidence tended to show that Rice's brickyard, though 
held by a precarious tenure, had a large market value. A thing 
is worth what it can be sold for. If Rice's interest would sell 
properly could be recognized in such proceedings), are immaterial. The 
learned justices stressed the inclusion of the term "good-·will.'' See Ez 
Parte Farlow, supra note 148, at 347. The reporters, at 349, have at-
tached a note in regard to another case where the tenant held "on an 
agreement for one year certain from 1\lichaelmas 1822, with liberty to the 
landlord afterwards to determine the tenancy in any year at three months' 
notice, and with a stipulation also that the tenant should not underlet or 
give up possession of the premises without leave in writing. The Court 
was of opinion that these conditions of holding, especially the last, es-
sentially distinguished this case from the preceding • • • " In a note to 
King v. Hungerford Market Co. (E:c Parte Still), supra note 148, at 595, 
the reporters state, as to the interest of the tenants in the three cases 
cited supra note 148: "Such an interest, it may be presumed, would be 
too slight and precarious to be noticed at law or in equity, if it were not 
upheld .... by conclusive words in an Act of Parliament." In n ca~e under 
another statute, the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Act, Loc. & Pers. 
Pub. Acts 7 GEo. IV c. 49 § 47 (1826), where the term "good-will" was 
omitted, a distinction was made upon that ground, and compem:ation 
denied to a tenant for a fbced term ousted at the expiration of his term, 
the condemning authority having taken a· deed from the reversioner. The 
tenant was said to have "merely a hope of renewal on the old terms, which, 
if there has been an improvement, were not likely to be granted, ·where 
there would have been a competition." Lord Denman, in King v. Liverpool 
and Manchester Ry., 4 Ad. & E. 650, 656 (K. B. 1836). This result was 
reached, although the act included occupiers, and provided for compem:a-
tion for "detriment, injury, damage, loss, inconvenience, or prejudice.'' 
15o Ex Pm·te Farlow, supra note 148, at 345. 
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for $4,000, it is worth $4,000, and the destruction of it would in-
jure him to that extent. It would be confiscation, pure and sim-
ple, to take it from him without paying him its value. It is not a 
question of the permanency of his-title to real estate, but of the 
salable value of such interest as he had .... The jury had a right 
to consider the probability of a renewal of Rice's term, because 
the evidence tended to show that this circumstance increased 
its market value." 151 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressly re-
fused to follow this case. Mr. Chief Justice Holmes said, l'efer-
ring to the facts of the case he was then deciding : 
"It appeared that the owners had been in the habit of renewing 
the petitioners' lease from time to time, and an attempt Was made 
to give this fact the aspect of an English customary right. '£he 
evidence merely showed that the landlords and the tenants were 
mutually satisfied and were likely to keep on together. It added 
nothing except by way of corroboration to the testimony that 
they both intended to keep on. Changeable intentions are not an 
interest in land, and although no doubt S\lCh intentions may have 
added practically to the value of the petitioners' holding, they 
could not be taken into account in determining what the re-
spondent should pay. They added nothing to the tenants' legal 
rights, and legal rights are all that must be paid for. For as 
under the statutes the land was to be valued as a whole, and then 
the amount subdivided (St. 1896, c. 516, sec. 23; Pub. St. c. 112, 
sees. 95, 100, 107; Id., c. 49, sees. 18, 22, 25), the view opposite 
to ours would allow the tenants to diminish the share of the 
landowners on the strength of the latter having entertained an 
intention which they were free to change if they chose." m 
m Mayor of Baltimore v. Rice, 73 Md. 307, 311, 21 Atl. 181, 182 (1891). 
The landlords' agent testified that the land in question was part of a larger 
tract which had been leased to numerous tenants in this way for half a 
century. The owners derived large revenues from such leases, and never 
removed a tenant who paid his rent promptly. A number of the tenants 
had erected expensive improvements, and the agent testified that ho had no 
doubt that the expectation of a renewal added largely to the market value 
of their interests. 
Under a Canadian statute the possibility of securing renewal of a lease 
has been taken into consideration in assessing damages. McGoldrick v. 
King, 8 Can. Exch. 169 (1902). Likewise, under a statute, in condo:mnatlon 
proceedings against a hotel, possibility of securing renewal of tho liquor 
license has been taken into consideration. In re Cavanagh and Canada 
Atlantic Ry., 14 Ont. L. R. 523, 529 (1907). 
152 Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 185, 59 N. E. 763, "/65 
(1901). The case involved the taking of a wharf. At the time possession 
was taken, the tenants were in under a lease for a fixed term. It was hold 
that evidence was correctly excluded which would, at most, have proved 
an arrangement for the tenants to hold at will beyond the expiration of 
the term. 
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Under the terminology suggested by Hohfeld, the tenants in 
this case had beneficial liabilities 1r.3 to have created in each of 
them, at the expiration of the existing term, the group of legal 
relations constituting the position of tenant for a future term. 
The landlords had correlative powers m to bring these legal re-
lations into existence. These powers and liabilities were de-
stroyed by the condemnation proceedings. This was done with-
out regard to the volition of the individuals concerned, and if 
they thereby sustained substantial loss, the social policy of emi-
nent domain proceedings required that they receive compensa-
tion. In making practical adjustments of such matters, in the 
absence of relevant evidence it could well be assumed that neither 
landlord nor tenant would enter into a lease upon an improvident 
basis, in accordance with what the court or jury might conceive 
to be their respective standpoints. But the best evidence as to 
what they would do is what they have done in the past, and in a 
case involving a tenant who is in possession, this evidence will 
ordinarily be present. Assuming similar conditions, this should 
govern the determination of the amount of their t·espective 
losses, and any opinion of court or jury as to the improvidence 
of either would be irrelevant. It seems that a court would have 
no hesitation in thus adjusting a situation involving interrup-
tion of a lease during its term. In such a situation the e::-..ient 
of the losses of the landlord and tenant "ill depend upon the na-
ture of the contract between them, and it is clear that their re-
spective shares of the compensation should be apportioned ac-
cordingly. 
Using a different method of approach, when a possibility of 
renewal of a lease is destroyed, a court should not feel compelled 
by juristic necessity to refuse compensation to the tenant. It ''ill 
not be questioned that a landlord and tenant have a right that 
third parties shall not interfere, by duress or other wrongful 
acts, with the future course of their mutual dealings. While there 
is no element of wrongdoing in instituting eminent domain pro-
ceedings, nevertheless it is a question of policy whether society 
should not recognize in the tenant a right not to be interfered 
with by such proceedings, so that, in case of invasion of the right, 
he will be entitled to compensation. It is simply a question 
whether an attempt should be made to compensate him for an 
actual loss sustained in that way. 
It is stated, in the opinion quoted, that the l\Iassachusetts 
statutes require that the land be valued as a whole, and the 
amount divided among the various claimants. Interpreting the 
statutes from a legal relations standpoint, in referring to land 1"' 
1~s HoHFELD, op. cit supra note 1, at 36, 58. 
154 Ibid. 50. 
1s~ While the distinction is not material in the present connection, from 
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they do not refer to the physical earth, but to the legal relations 
which sufficiently involve the enjoyment of certain physical earth 
so as to be cognizable in the statutory proceedings. A determina~ 
tion as to where to draw the line, as to what legal relations should 
be so recognized, should be made upon considerations of social 
policy, tempered by the requirements of expediency. The sug~ 
gestion that an award to the tenant will necessarily diminish 
that to the landlord, has already been considered. It may be 
granted that the general attitute of the courts, both English and 
American, is such as to justify the conclusion that on legalistic 
grounds they will refuse to grant the tenant relief in this con~ 
nection. 
The value of land, and of most other objects of value, is based 
almost entirely upon unenforceable expectations in regard to the 
conduct of other persons.156 When the courts, in any connection, 
arbitrarily refuse to consider such expectations, they are closing 
their eyes to the most important facts of economic existence. The 
question has often been asked, how much good a million dollars 
would do a person upon a desert island. The problem of the ef~ 
feet of expectations upon value was presented in concrete form 
in a case in which the damages caused by the abolition of a grade 
crossing were being assessed. It was urged that in determining 
the value of the petitioners' land its proximity to railroad facil~ 
ities could not be taken into consideration, as the petitioners had 
no right to compel their continuance. Mr. Justice Loring, of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, anticipating in 1901 
the work of the behaviourists, said: 
"If the respondent were right in its contention that this fact 
could not be consider~d because the petitioners had no legal right 
to have the spur tracks continue, the fact ±hat a lot of land is in 
the business portion of a city or town in place of in the residen~ 
tial or other less valuable portion of it, could not be taken into 
consideration in determining its market value; the owner of a 
lot of land in the business centre of a city has no legal right to 
have the business of the city done in that neighborhood; but the 
fact that it is done there, and is likely to continue to be done 
there, is a fact which affects the market value of the land." 107 
a legal relations standpoint a statute referring to "land" p1•esents a dif· 
ferent problem from that arising under a constitutional provision that 
"property" shall not be taken. Such a statute requires that the legal rola· 
tions involved have a reasonably close connection with the enjoyment of 
physical earth. The constitutional provision is not so limited. 
1GG "Market value" represents a "series of annual incomes capitalized 
into a fund of value." ELY AND MOREHOUSE, ELEMENTS OF LAND ECONOM• 
ICS (1924) 241. 
1sr New York, N.H. & H. R. R. v. Blacker, 178 Mass. 386, 390, 59 N. E. 
1020, 1021 (1901). 
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Under a physical conception of the process involved in eminent 
domain proceedings, when part of a tract of land is physi~'llly 
appropriated the owner may recover the amount of the damage 
to the remainder of the tract, even though there could have been 
no recovery for such damage, standing by itself.l~8 The distinc-
tion thus based upon the taking of a part of the tract is made 
because of the necessity that is felt that some sort of a physical 
appropriation be found to constitute a taking. This requirement 
having been satisfied, all the damages sustained are mvarded, 
and no difficulty is felt because of the source of any portion of 
the loss. The entire amount of the damages is thought of as being 
damage because of the taking. There seems to be no justification 
for the distinction, other than legalistic, unless as a protection 
against the assertion of fictitious claims. The slight effect in that 
regard does not seem to be sufficient to justify the discrimination 
between two classes of citizens. If the problems of eminent do-
main proceedings are approached from a legal relations stand-
point, there is no necessity for the distinction, and, in fact, it is 
entirely meaningless.m From this standpoint, as has been sug-
gested, any assessment of damages is a measurement of the ex-
tent of property. 
Under a physical conception of the eminent domain process, 
the total amount of the compensation paid the owners of various 
estates in a single res must necessarily equal the total value of 
the res, standing as a unit in a single fee simple estate. From a 
physical standpoint the lav;r has no concern with the existence of 
various estates. If the value of the res is assessed and paid, the 
damages have equalled the e}t..1:ent of the taking, and that amount 
must be divided among the owners of the various interests. From 
a legal relations viewpoint, the situation of each individual in-
volved must be separately examined, and the total compensation 
paid may or may not be more than the value of the land, held as 
a single fee simple estate. It was said, in a Massachusetts <:.'lse, 
that the relations among themselves of those having various es-
tates in the same tract of land could not be taken into consider-
ation, upon the ground that contracts between the owners of the 
various interests could not be permitted to "affect the right of 
the government to take the land for the public use, or oblige it to 
pay by way of compensation more than the entire value of the 
158 2 LEWIS, 1176; 2 NICHOLS, 721, 852, 896. Various tracts owned by 
the same owner are treated as separate tracts for purposes of the distinc-
tion. 2 LEWIS, 1207; 2 NICHOLS, 737. 
159 The distinction is criticized in County Court of :Marion Co., W. Va. 
v United States, 53 Ct. CI. 120, 139 (1918), and Queen v. Essex, 17 Q. B. 
D. 447, 452 (1886), rev'd, sub. nom. Cowper ·Esse.'\: v. Local Board for 
Action, 14 App. Cas. 153 (1889), and questioned by Mr. Justice Holmes in 
Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 368, 375, 41 N. E. 489, 490 (1895). 
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land as a whole." 160 The physical viewpoint is apparent. In an~ 
other case, in the same court, it was admitted that the sum of 
the market worth of the various interests, valued separately, 
might exceed the market value of the entire interest in the land, 
considered as one estate.101 It was said that it did not follow that 
it was unjust to the owners of the various interests to use the 
latter method of computation. No reason for this conclusion was 
given, but it follows naturally from the use of a physical con~ 
cept. 
In a third case, 102 in the same court, the facts were reversed, 
and the value of the land as a whole was greater than the actual 
damage to the owners of the various interests. Land was being 
condemned for street purposes which was already subject to a 
private easement of way, light, and air in favor of one of the 
parties to the proceeding. It was agreed that if the land was to 
be regarded as though held in a fee simple estate by a single 
owner it was worth $60,000, but that the damages actually caused 
the parties were only $5,000. The court seized upon the fact 
that the statute under which the later proceedings were had pro~ 
vided for compensation for the "damages sustained by the 
owners," and awarded the smaller sum. From the standpoint o.f 
adjustment of the legal relations involved, this result is correct, 
but consistency would have required a holding that what hacl been 
taken was an entire single estate in the land, and that, regard~ 
less of the provisions of the statute, the constitutional provi~ 
sion in regard to the taking of property required compensation 
for that estate. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Holmes said: 
"The only question to be considered is whether when a man's 
land is taken he is entitled, by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
recover more than the value of it as it stood at the time. . .. 
It is true that the mere mode of occupation does not necessarily 
limit the right of an owner's recovery. [citing cases] But the 
Constitution does not require a disregard of the mode of owner~ 
ship-of the state of the title. It does not require a parcel of land 
to be valued as an unencumbered whole when it is not held ns 
an unencumbered whole. It merely requires that an owner of 
property taken should be paid for what is taken from him. It 
deals with persons, not with tracts of land. And the question is 
16° Mr. Chief Justice Gray, in Burt v. Merchants' Insurance Co., 115 
Mass. 1, 15 (1874). In the view which the court took of tho cas~, tho 
statement quoted was dictum. The case was a condemnation proceeding 
instituted by the United States in the name of an agent. The sumo state~ 
ment was quoted as dictu'm in Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston & 
P.R. Corp., 209 Mass. 298, 305, 95 N. E. 887, 890 (1911). 
161 Edmands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535, 549 (1871). 
162 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 195 Mass. 338, 81 
N. E. 244 (1907), aff'd, cit. supra note 26. 
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what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.1~3 We 
regard it as entirely plain that the petitioners were not entitled 
as matter of law to have the damages estimated as if the land 
was the sole property of one owner .... " lG~ 
This reasoning, applied consistently, would seem upon con-
stitutional grounds to prevent use of the value of the land as a 
single estate to limit the compensation paid the owners of the 
various interests.1~~ 
In a case involving a ground rent, l\:Ir. Justice Boyd, of the 
Court of Appeals of l\Ia11dand, recognized that in order to do 
justice to all the parties concerned, it would sometimes be neces- . 
sary to make exceptions to the general rule of valuing the land 
as a single estate and then dividing the proceeds. He said: 
" ... We are ... of the opinion that owing to the peculiar 
character of this class of property, if it be proven that the rever-
sioner's interest was worth ~10,000 and the leaseholder's ~52,500, 
the latter sum could be allowed, although the whole property, if 
no ground rent had been on it, would only have been worth 
$60,000. We say that because each is entitled under the Consti-
tution to be compensated in damages for the amount of his in-
terest taken, and, if it be true that the values of the two inter-
ests are more than what the lots would be worth, if owned by one 
person, the necessities of the case require an apparent exception 
to the general rule announced above as to what the condemning 
party must pay .... Indeed when a piece of property which is 
subject to an ordinary lease for a short term is taken, it may 
happen that although the owner of the fee is allowed full value 
for the property, the tenant must also be paid a large and sub-
stantial amount in addition, by reason of the value of his 
lease." 1'36 
When condemnation of land necessitates removal or discon-
tinuance of a business which has been conducted upon it, ele-
ments of damage such as loss of profits, destruction of good will 
or going concern values, or expenses of removal, m·e frequently 
present. The speculative character of the losses often is such as 
to justify, upon practical grounds, a refusal to attempt to assess 
the damages. The decision as to whether conipensation should 
be made generally has been reached, however, upon purely legal-
163 This is the usual method of approacl1. Hale, l•al1~c to the Tal:cl' in 
Condemncition Cases (1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 1. This article dil::cus:;:-es the 
interesting question whether special value of the premises to the taker can 
be permitted to affect the market value, as determined for purp.oEes of 
compensation. Ibid. 10. 
16"' Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, supm note 26, at 194, 
30 Sup. Ct. at 460. 
165 Cf. cases discussed in 2 LEWIS, 1253, and 1 NICIIOLS, 707, '109. 
1661\Iayor of City of Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 1\Id. 621, 631, 61 Atl. 
203, 206 (1905); see State v. Hall, 28 S. W. (2d) 80, 82 ()lo. 1930). 
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istic grounds, with a physical conception of the eminent domain 
process in mind.161 Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis has said: 
"There is no finding as a fact that the Government took the 
business, or that what it did was intended as a taking. If the 
business was destroyed, the destruction was an unintended inci-
dent of the taking of lands." 168 
In another case compensation for business losses was refused, 
although a statute provided for compensation for 11all damages 
that may be sustained," as it was reasoned that the petitioners 
were claiming only as landholders suffering from the taldng of a 
portion oftheir land.m From the standpoint of the legal rela· 
tions involved, in all cases of business losses there has been vio· 
lation of the right of the one owning or leasing the land, and 
conducting the business thereon, not to be disturbed in his oc-
cupancy of the premises, and to the extent that such 1·ight has 
been violated his property has been taken. Mr. Justice John B. 
Gibson, before he became Chief Justice, based a refusal of com· 
pensation in such a case upon the ground that such losses are 
"only collateral to the assuming of the rights of the citizen." 110 
In reply to the cases denying compensation for loss of profits, it 
has been well said : 
"By changing the words of Lord Coke from 'What is property 
but the use thereof' into 'What is business but the profits there-
from,' the contention that the business is not taken or damaged 
appears to be answered. Nothing could be more absurd than to 
say that a retail grocery business forced through eminent do· 
main proceedings to leave the community wherein each and every 
one of its customers resided, is not taken or damaged." 111 
In a case refusing compensation for expenses of removal, the 
interesting suggestion is made that: 11As the title to all property 
is held subject to the implied condition that it must be surren-
167 Compensation generally has been denied. As to profits: 2 LEWIS, 
1271; 1 NICHOLS, 698; 2 ibid. 1170, 1173. As to good will: 2 LEWIS, 1276 i 
1 NICHOLS, 366, 685; 698. As to expenses of removal: 2 LEWIS, 127 4, 1277; 
1 NICHOLS, 697. Contra, as to going concern values: 1 NtOHOLS, 685; 
semble, ibid. 665; 2 LEWIS, 1176, 1228. 
The English view is more liberal, and allows compensation fox• nll tho 
items mentioned. 6 HALSBURY, 36. 
1as Mitchell v. United States, supra note 82, at 345, 45 Sup. Ct. nt 204. 
In this case the flooding of land for reservoir purposes necessitated tho 
sale of cattle. 
1G9 Mr. Chief Justice Shaw, in Boston and Worcester R.R. v. Old Colony 
R. R., 12 Cush. (66 Mass.) 605, 611 (1853). 
1-;o Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thoburn, 7 Serg. & R. 411, 422 (Pn. 
1821). This is the great leading case in this connection. 
m (1916) 4 CALIF. L. REV. 248, 249. 
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dered whenever the public interest requires it, the inconvenience 
and expense incident to the surrender of possession are not ele-
ments to be considered in determining the damages to which 
the owner is entitled." 172 The implication of such a condition, 
without any consideration of the practical aspects of the situa-
tion, is a highly legalistic method of solution of the problem. If 
such a condition is to be implied, presumably as a part of the 
social compact, it would seem that the comt might well imply 
a like condition that the fee simple title is held subject to the 
existence of necessity for its surrender when required for the 
public welfare, and thus avoid the payment of compensation alto-
gether.173 
It is neither necessary nor desirable that legalistic considera-
tions have any place in connection with the awarding of com-
pensation in eminent domain proceedings. Considerations of 
policy should control. If from the standpoint of policy it is de-
sirable that a citizen have compensation, there should be no hesi..: 
tation, under constitutional provisions, in awarding it to him. 
The legal relations of au -individual cover every aspect of his 
e}..-istence, and when there is violation of these relations his prop-
erty is taken.174 Manifestly, it is not practicable for society to 
compensate the individual for every such consequence of con-
demnation proceedings, any more than it is feasible for the courts 
to take into consideration the remote consequences of torts or 
other occurrences. The problem is one of practical expediency. 
The judicial experiences in the administration of eminent domain 
proceedings-indicate that it is important that the problem be rec-
ognized, in this field as elsewhere, as one of drawing the line 
1721'1lr. Justice Clark, in Ranlet v. Concord R.R., 62 N. H. 561, 564 
(1883). 
173 In State v. Dawson, 3 Hill (21 S. C.) 100, 102, 104-105 (1836), it was 
suggested that in every grant of land by the st3te there was an implied 
reservation that land and timber and other materials might be taken for 
road purposes. The authority to take land is di:;:cussed at length in Lind-
say v. East Bay Street Com'rs, 2 Bay (2 S. C.) 38 (1796). In Wilcox"· 
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 52, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 200 (1909), where 
a public utility was itself condemned, l\lr. Justice Peckham put the reiuEal 
of compensation for loss of "good will" values upon the ground that in the 
case of monopolistic public utilities any question of "good will" is irrelevant. 
This reasoning would undoubtedly strike a responsive chord in the minds 
of many consumers, and does not seem to be open to criticism. 
1H ''If the railway encroaches in any degree upon the plaintiff's proprie-
tary rights, then it is clear that the constitutional inhibition, which for-
l?ids the taking of private property for public use 'without just comprm-
sation,' applies to the case." l\Ir. Justice Selden, in Williams v. New York 
Central R.R., 16 N. Y. 97, 100 (1857). The case involved an added bur-
den on a highway. 
For an interesting comparative study of extensh·c interference with 
legal relations without compensation, see Barker, Nnt• Lalt'S and National-
ism in llfe::cico (1927) 5 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 589. 
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between proximate and remote consequences.m 
It may be suggested that in all fields of thought the early, 
simple concepts are of a physical character, and that advance is 
made to concepts of a more abstract nature. Such a change may 
be regarded as inevitable as more complicated problems are 
solved or old problems are given more delicately adjusted solu-
tions. It may be suggested that the history of both the physical 
and the social sciences evidences such development.110 Whether 
the general suggestion be justified or not, it is believed that the 
thought is pertinent as applied to the field of eminent domain 
and the accomplishment of the social purpose therein involved. 
175 It is sometimes stated that the principles of the general law of 
damages apply to acts done under the power of eminent domain. Pool 
v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. 138, 140, 11 S. E. 5821 583 (1890) ; Austin v. 
Augusta Terminal Ry., supra note 129, at 674, 34 S. E. at 853; Rignoy v. 
City of Chicago, supra note 126, at 81; O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, 25 
Minn. 331, 334 (1878) ; Stuhl v. Great Northern Ry., supra note 120, at 
161, 161 N. W., at 502; In re Hull, 163 Minn. 430, 453, 204 N. W. 534, 539 
(1925); Indian Creek Drainage Dist. No. l;,,y. Garrott, 123 Miss. 301, 321, 
85 So. 312, 319 (1920); Thompson v. Androscoggin Co., supra; note 07, at 
554; Columbia Delaware Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 55 N.J. L. 558, 563 (1871); 
Staton v. Norfolk & Carolina R.R., supra note 11, at 288, 16 S. E. at 18•1; 
Hyde v. Minnesota, Dakota & Pacific Ry., supra note 138, at 235, 136 N. 
W. at 98; G. C. & S. F. Ry. v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467, 471 (1885); Lambot•t 
v. Norfolk, supra note 129, at 259, 61 S. E. at 778; Smith v. St. Paul, 
Minneapolis & 1\i. Ry., 39 Wash. 355, 360, 81 Pac. 840, 842 (1905); 6 
HALSBURY, 44, 49; 1 LEWIS, 57, 444. 
At other times it is stated that ·in eminent domain proceedings compenBa· 
tion will be granted for elements of loss for which no damages would be 
awarded in actions between private parties. Lake Erie & Western R.R. v, 
Scott, 132 Ill. 429, 436, 24 N. E. 78, 80 (1890); Des Moines Wet Wnah 
Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 Ia. 1082, 1090, 198 N. W. 486, 400 (1924); 
Woodbury v. Inhabitants of Beverly, 153 Mass. 245, 247, 26 N. E. 851, 852 
(1891); Harmon v. Omaha, 17 Neb. 548, 550 (1885); Tidewater Ry. v. 
Shartzer, 107 Va. 562, 567, 59 S. E. 401, 409 (1907); 2 NICHOLS, 8531 855, 
176 COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) 3·60 pMsim, 
165, 181, 184-191, 199, 211, 238, 247, 264, 274, 282, 314-320 passim, 374; 
Cook, Scientific lVIethod and the Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 303. 
APPENDIX A. 
Cases, not else,vhere cited, indicating the use of a physical conception of 
the eminent domain process. Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536, 541 (1874); Brad-
ley v. New York & N.H. R.R., 21 Conn. 294, 309 (1851); Woodruff v. Cat· 
lin, 54 Conn. 277, 295, 6 Atl. 849, 854 (1886); Opinion of Westcott, J., in 
Public Works, 13 Fla. 700, 701 (1871); Hurt v. City of Atlanta, 100 Ga. 
274, 280, 28 S. E. 65, 68 (1896); Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 32., 
72 Pac. 140, 141, 61 L. R. A. 601, 602 (1903); Matter of Hamilton Avenue, 
Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 405, 411. (N. Y. Sup. 1852); Atwatet• v. Trustees o£ 
Village of Canandaigua, 124 N. Y. 602, 609, 27 N. E. 385, 387 (1891); 
Godley v. The City, 7 Phila. 637, 641 (Pa. 1869); Salt Lake City v. Enst 
Jordan Irr. Co., 40 Utah 126, 137, 121 Pac. 592, 596 (1911); Lund v. Snit 
Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 553, 200 Pac. 510, 513 (1921). 
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APPENDIX B. 
Cases, not elsewhere cited, indicating the use of a legal relations concep-
tion of the eminent domain process. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 206 
U. S. 149, 151, 45 Sup. Ct. 38 (1924) ; Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Rail-
road Commission, 176 Cal. 518, 528, 169 Pac. 62, 66 (1917); Tripp v. Over-
acker, 7 Colo. 72, 74, 1 Pac. 695, 697 (1883) ; Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. 
Public Utilities Commission, 69 Colo. 275, 279, 193 Pac. 726, 728 (1920); 
C. & W. I. R.R. v. E. C. Ry., 115 Ill. 375, 385, 4 N. E. 240, 249 (1886); 
Evansville and C. R.R. v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433, 436 (1857) ; Kemper v. City 
of Louisville, 14 Bush (77 Ky.) 87, 90, 93 (1878); Lee v. Pembroke Iron 
Co., 57 Me. 481, 484 (1867) ; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 :Mich. 296, 301 
(1877); Pearsall v. Supervisors, 74 Mich. 558, 561, 42 N. W. 77, 4 L. R. A. 
193, 194 (1889) ; Adams v. Chicago, B. & N. R.R., 39 Minn. 280, 290, 39 
N. W. 629, 631 (1888) ; Broadwell v. City of Kansas, 75 Mo. 213, 218 
(1881) ; Prairie Pipe Line Co. v. Shipp, 305 1\Io. 663, 672, 267 S. W. 647, 
649 (1924); City of Omaha v. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 493, 41 N. W. 295, 
296 (1889); Forster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577, 584, 32 N. E. 976, 977, 18 L. 
R. A. 543, 547 (1893); Garvey v. Long Island R.R., 159 N. Y. 323, 329, 
54 N. E. 57, 58 (1899); Syracuse Solar Salt Co. v. Rome, W. & 0. R. R., 
43 App. Div. 203, 209, 60 N. Y. Supp. 40, 44 (3rd Dep't. 1899), aff'd, 16S 
N.Y. 650, 61 N. E. 1135 (1901); Rome, Watertown & 0. R.R. v. Gleason .. 
42 App. Div. 530, 533, 59 N. Y. Supp. 647, 649 (4th Dep't. 1889); Gordon 
v. Village of Silver Creek, 127 App. Div. 888, 891, 112 N. Y. Supp. 54, 56 
(4th Dep't 1908) ; Crawford v. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459, 471 
(1857); Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 333, 346 (1858); City 
of Mansfield v. Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 471, 63 N. E. 86, 92, 58 L. R. A. 
628, 635 (1902); Callen v. Columbus Edison Electric Light Co., 66 Ohio 
St. 166, 175, 64 N. E. 141, 143 (1902); G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Fuller, 63 
Tex. 467, 469 (1885); Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry., 28 Utah 201, 
211, 77 Pac. 849, 852 (1904); Foster v. Stafford Nat. Bank, 57 Vt. 128, 
133 (1884); State v. Superior Court, 26 Wash. 278, 286, 66 Pnc. 385, 388 
(1901); Great Northern Ry. v. State, 102 Wash. 348, 351, 173 Pac. 40, 42 
(1918); Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 460, 84 S. E. 105, 106, 
L. R. A. 1915C 981, 983 (1915); Goodall v. City of Milwaul{ee, 5 Wis. 32, 
39, 46 (1856); Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288, 301, 46 N. W. 128, 132 
(1890); Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 596, 194 N. W. 159, 162, 34 A. L. R. 
32, 38 (1923). 
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